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                         April 16, 2020     
  
 
To: Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Commercial, and Administrative Law 
Committee on the Judiciary 
U.S. House of Representatives 
 
Re: Competition in the Digital Marketplace 
 
Dear Chairman Cicilline and Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, 
 
  Your letter of March 13, 2020 asked a number of excellent questions concerning 
the adequacy of existing antitrust laws, enforcement policies, and enforcement levels 
insofar as they impact the state of competition in the digital marketplace. You specifically 
asked about: 
 
1. The adequacy of existing laws that prohibit monopolization and monopolistic conduct,  
including whether current statutes and case law are suitable to address any potentially  
anti-competitive conduct. 
 Congress in 1890 actually intended that Section 2 of the Sherman Act should lead 
to the imposition of sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless 
whether the firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. Unfortunately, misguided 
judicial interpretations of this statute require government and private plaintiffs to prove 
that the firm involved engaged in anticompetitive activity. This requirement, and the 
overly strict way courts have implemented it, have rendered Section 2 almost a nullity. 
Congress should amend Section 2 to clarify and ratify its original intention.  
 At a minimum, new legislation should create a presumption that the antitrust laws 
should impose sanctions on all firms with more than 67% of a relevant market,1 unless 
defendants can overcome this presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence 
that the firm does not have monopoly power.  
 Currently, “The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two 
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as 
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident (i.e. 
 
1 Recent cases have held that there is no more than a presumption that firms possessing 
this market share have monopoly power.  See Verizon Communications v. Trinko, 540 
U.S.  398 (2004).    
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anticompetitive conduct).”2  Plaintiff victories under this standard have been rare, and as 
a consequence an undue number of monopolies have emerged and persisted  
 This legislation would move the interpretation of the Sherman Act towards the 
original manner in which Congress intended this law to operate. The attached article 
(Appendix I3) demonstrates that Congress in 1890 actually intended Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act to be a “no-fault” statute. Section 2 is supposed to impose sanctions on all 
monopolies and attempts to monopolize, not just those for which plaintiff can prove that 
defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct.  
 The attached article demonstrates this by engaging in the first ever “textualist 
analysis”, a form of statutory interpretation vigorously championed by Justice Scalia and 
many others, of the language in Section 2. It analyzes contemporaneous dictionaries, 
legal treatises, and cases.  It shows that when the Sherman Act was passed in 1890, the 
word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired a monopoly. The term was 
not limited to monopolies acquired through anticompetitive conduct. A textualist analysis 
therefore demonstrates that Section 2 was designed to impose sanctions on all 
monopolies and attempts to monopolize. Current case law requiring plaintiffs to prove 
defendants engaged in improper conduct must be overturned.  
 The attached paper also briefly analyzes the practical economic implications 
likely to follow if the courts adopt this approach to monopolization and attempted 
monopolization law. The overall economic effects are shown to be uncertain, and to 
depend upon empirical issues whose net effect is speculative or ambiguous. The 
economic analysis nevertheless provide support for the no-fault position, and a fortiori 
demonstrates that the article’s textualist conclusions should be implemented.  
 The paper shows that there are many important benefits likely to result from a no-
fault approach to monopolization law. Imposing sanctions on all monopolies is likely to 
improve economic welfare in many ways. It should increase innovation and international 
competitiveness. It should prevent the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly pricing 
and the form of exploitation that arises when monopolies raise prices and thereby acquire 
wealth from consumers. It would be likely to decrease the inefficiencies that result from 
monopolies enjoying a “quiet life”. It should avoid the waste that can arise as a firm 
struggles to attain and protect its monopoly, and some of the time and cost of Section 2 
litigation. It should decrease income inequality.4 
 
2 See United States v. Grinnell Corp, 384 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1966). 
 
3  The Appendix is Robert H. Lande & Richard O. Zerbe Jr., “The Sherman Act Is A No-
Fault Monopolization Statute: A Textualist Demonstration”.  
4  This new standard would, admittedly, give rise to some costs and difficulties. For 
example, imposing sanctions on all monopolies could sometimes send a confusing or 
perverse signal to firms engaging in hard but fair competition, especially as a firm’s 
3 
 
 In recent years there have been many calls, from very different parts of the 
political spectrum, for imposing sanctions on, and even breaking up, monopolies without 
inquiring into whether they engaged in anticompetitive conduct. The article analyzes the 
effects these conclusions should have on case outcomes under both the “monopolization” 
and “attempt to monopolize” portions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It also discusses 
why, a fortiori, no-fault monopolization should constitute a violation of Section 5 of the 
FTC Act.  
 New legislation creating a strong presumption that a firm with a 67% market 
share has violated the antitrust laws would be an important step in the right direction, the 
direction that Congress intended in 1890. 
 
2. The adequacy of existing laws that prohibit anti-competitive transactions, including 
whether current statutes and case law are sufficient to address potentially anti-
competitive vertical and conglomerate mergers, serial acquisitions, data acquisitions, or 
acquisitions of potential competitors. 
 The antitrust laws, as they are presently interpreted, are incapable of blocking 
most of the very largest corporate mergers and acquisitions. They successfully blocked 
only three of the seventy-eight largest finalized mergers and acquisitions (defined as 
cases where both the acquiring and the acquired firm were valued at more than $10 
billion) that occurred between 2015 and 2019.5  The antitrust laws also would permit the 
first trillion-dollar corporation, Apple, to merge with the (as of the summer of 2019) third 
largest corporation, Exxon/Mobil. In fact, today every U.S. corporation could merge until 
just ten were left—so long as each owned only 10% of every relevant market.6     
 Even though the Congresses that enacted the anti-merger laws did so having, 
among other aims, the goal of limiting the political power of corporations, today the 
federal antitrust agencies and courts interpret these laws only in terms of price and other 
 
market share neared the ambiguous level required for a violation. The transaction costs 
involved in imposing sanctions on monopolies could be significant. It also could lead to 
difficult remedy issues in cases involving natural and patent monopolies. But these issues 
are very likely to be outweighed by the proposal’s benefits. 
5  See Robert H. Lande & Sandeep Vaheesan, “Preventing The Curse of Bigness Through 
Conglomerate Merger Legislation,” (forthcoming in the ARIZONA STATE L. J. (2020)); 
available at  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463878 and at 
https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac/1102/  
 




economic effects within discrete markets. Under current merger practice, the enhanced 
political power of corporations is irrelevant. 
 However, from Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders on the left, to 
President Trump and many others on the right, there is a renewed interest in using 
antitrust to control corporate size, structure, and practices. There is popular desire both to 
prevent large mergers and to break up existing companies, such as Facebook, Amazon 
and Google, that achieved their size, power and dominant positions in part due to 
hundreds of acquisitions,7 some of which were extremely large.8     
 In light of recent developments within most of the political spectrum, an article I 
co-authored with Sandeep Vaheesan of the Open Markets Institute proposes model 
conglomerate merger legislation suitable for our era. 9   This legislation would block 
every merger – horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate - that exceeds clearly specified asset 
thresholds. We are proposing a law that would block every merger in which both firms 
have assets exceeding $10 billion, unless they spin-off assets so that their increase in size 
falls below the figure. This threshold would block at most fifteen to twenty-five of the 
largest mergers each year. 
 This Article undertakes a legal, economic, and political analysis of conglomerate 
merger legislation. It demonstrates that our proposed legislation would: 1. Produce no 
significant losses in corporate efficiency; 2. Be clearer and more predictable than the 
existing anti-merger laws and thus would enhance the rule of law; and 3. Help prevent 
significant increases in corporate political power and other forms of non-economic power 
caused by the largest mergers. 
 
3. Whether the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement – including the current 
levels of appropriations to the antitrust agencies, existing agency authorities, 
congressional oversight of enforcement, and current statutes and case law – is adequate to 
promote the robust enforcement of the antitrust laws.                                          
 
 
7 “In total, Facebook managed to string together 67 unchallenged acquisitions, which seems 
impressive, unless you consider that Amazon undertook 91 and Google got away with 214 
(a few of which were conditioned).” TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE 
NEW GILDED AGE 123 (Columbia Global Reports 2018).  
 
8  For example, Microsoft purchased LinkedIn for $26.2 billion and Skype for $8.5 billion; 
Facebook purchased WhatsApp for $19 billion; and Amazon purchased Whole Foods for 
$13.7 billion. These companies also acquired a number of other companies for more than 
$1 billion each. See Lande & Vaheesan, supra note 5. 
 




 There are many additional ways in which the antitrust laws and their enforcement 
could be improved significantly.  Here are 7 of the most important: 
 
 
A. Legislatively resurrect the Supreme Court’s Philadelphia National Bank anti-merger 
presumption.   
 
 In 1963 the Supreme Court held that mergers producing a firm with an undue 
share of a moderately or highly concentrated relevant market “must be enjoined in the 
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such 
anticompetitive effects.... [and] we are clear that 30% presents that threat.”10 
Unfortunately, this presumption has faded almost completely over time, and is now all-
but ignored by the enforcers and the courts.11  
 
 Legislation should force the enforcers and courts to return to the original 
formulation of this doctrine.  It should create a presumption that mergers to a total of 
more than 30% of a market should be presumed illegal, and that this presumption could 
be overcome only by “clear and convincing evidence” clearly showing that the merger 
will not be anticompetitive, and also that any efficiencies produced by the merger will be 
passed to consumers. It is noteworthy that this presumption originally was drafted by a 
then-Supreme Court law clerk, Richard Posner, who still believes it is desirable.12 
 
                                                                                      
B.  Forbid common stock ownership of competing firms above specified de minimus 
limits. 
 
 Professor Einer Elhauge and others have shown that a handful of extremely large 
institutional investors in total own large and perhaps controlling amounts of the stock of a 
large number of competing corporations, including those in the airline industry.13  This 
common stock ownership distorts these companies’ competitive incentives in a large 
number ways, and easily can result in higher prices for consumers.  
 
 It is, however, uncertain whether this type of common stock ownership violates 
any existing antitrust law.14  New legislation could clarify this by preventing the same 
 
10 See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). 
 
11 See Peter Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, “The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the 
Importance of 'Redundant' Competitors,” 2018 WISCONSIN L. REV. 783 (2018). 
 
12 See Philadelphia National Bank at 50: An Interview with Judge Richard Posner, 80 
ANTITRUST L.J. 205, 216 (2015). 
13 See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016). 
14 For a more complete discussion, see id. 
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stockholders from owning clearly specified and significant amounts of the stock of 
competing companies. The law could contain exceptions to allow the same person to own 
small amounts of stock in competing corporations. These exceptions could be patterned 
after the current law that forbids the same individual from being an officer or director of 
competing firms, but includes a number of de minimus exceptions for overlaps of less 
than $34 million (a figure the FTC revises annually), or 2-4% of sales, etc.15  
 
 
C.  Allow indirect purchaser consumers to sue for damages under the federal antitrust 
laws. 
 
 Under the Supreme Court’s Illinois Brick decision the federal antitrust laws only 
permit direct purchasers to sue for damages.16 Because of this case, consumers who are 
indirect purchasers, and quite often are the victims that ultimately pay a cartel’s or 
monopoly’s overcharges, have no standing to sue for damages.   
 
 Some states’ antitrust laws do, however, allow indirect purchasers to sue.17  Even 
in these states however, the courts never allow the total of direct and indirect damages to 
exceed treble damages. Although defendants claim it could theoretically be possible for 
this to happen, it has never occurred.18 By far the more common result is that the cartel or 
monopoly pays much less than single damages in a settlement, and the consumer-end 
user victims, who absorb much or all of the overcharges, receive little or nothing in 
damages.19  This could be changed by federal legislation that would also give standing to 
purchasers who are end users of the cartelized or monopolized products to sue for 
damages.20 
 
15 See Clayton Act., Section 8 (1990).  It contains a number of exceptions. Section 8(a)(5) 
requires the Federal Trade Commission to revise those thresholds annually, based on 
changes in the Gross National Product. 
 
16 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977). 
 
17 For a discussion see Robert H. Lande, “New Options for State Indirect Purchaser 
Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of Antitrust Violations,” 61 ALABAMA L. REV. 
447 (2010). 
 
18 Id.  Instead courts often bring direct and indirect purchasers together and allocate the 
damages between them.  
 
19 See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, “Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are 
Mostly Less Than Single Damages, “100 IOWA L. REV. 1997 (2015) (victims of only 14 
of the 71 studied cartels received single damages or more; the median average settlement 
was 37% of single damages). 
 






D. Award automatic prejudgment interest to successful victims of antitrust violations. 
 
 Violations of the antitrust laws give rise to corporate and individual penalties, and 
are supposed to result in victorious private plaintiffs receiving treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees.  Yet, these cases usually take many years to litigate, but these penalties 
do not include prejudgment interest.21  
 
 Legislation adding prejudgment interest to both criminal and civil violations 
would increase their effective size significantly, especially for durable cartels and for 
defendants that use delaying tactics during plea bargaining or litigation.22  This change 
would be considered reasonable and intuitively sound by many people from all parts of 
the political system.                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
E. Double the U.S. Sentencing Commission presumption that cartels raise prices by 10%. 
 
 Cartel fines long have been calculated on the basis of a formula promulgated by 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission in 1987. The lynchpin of this formula is its estimate 
“that the average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent of the selling price.”23  However, 
the median average cartel overcharge over the last 20 years has been more than 22%, and 
the mean overcharge has been 49%.24 The U.S. Sentencing Commission should double its 
current presumption that cartels raise prices by an average of 10%. This would increase 
criminal fines substantially.                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                              
 




21 For an analysis of the empirical significance of the absence of prejudgment interest in 
antitrust and its effects on effective sanctions levels see Robert H. Lande, “Are Antitrust 
“Treble” Damages Really Single Damages, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 115, 130-36 (1993).  See 
also Connor & Lande, supra note 18, which showed that victims of only 14 of the 71 
studied cartels received single damages or more; the median average settlement was 37% 
of single damages. 
 
22 See Lande, id. at 130-36. 
 
23 See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, “Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime 
Pays,” 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 428, 435-47 (2012). 
 





 As Judge Douglas Ginsburg and others have recommended, “as part of its plea 
agreements with corporations, the DOJ should insist that the corporate defendant agree 
not to hire or re-hire anyone who has been convicted of price-fixing. These bans should 
remain in effect for a substantial period – say, five years after the employee gets out of 
prison.... the Department [also] should insist that corporations not pay the fines of their 
convicted employees, either directly or indirectly, or compensate them for serving 
time.“25 
                                    
 
G. Enact antitrust whistleblower legislation.  
 
 The United States could implement a whistleblower reward or bounty system for 
individuals who turn in cartels, and perhaps even for corporations who do this. This 
would be similar to legislation in the securities area. As former Republican FTC Chair 
William Kovacic and others have concluded, new bounty or reward proposals are likely 
to enhance cartel detection and to destabilize cartels even more than the current leniency 
and amnesty programs.26  
 
 These bounties could be introduced gradually, and initially could be limited to 
individuals. But if necessary, a bounty might be awarded to corporations that turn in 
cartels, even if they had once been a member of the cartel. Perhaps amnesty recipients 
could be given 10% of other cartel participants’ fines, and if 10% is insufficient, this 
figure could be increased.        
 
 
 Please do not hesitate to contact me, at rlande@ubalt.edu or at 301-213-4539 if I 
can provide you with any additional information concerning any of these topics. 
 
 
       Sincerely yours, 
 
 
       Robert H. Lande 
       Venable Professor of Law 
       U. Baltimore School of Law 
 
25 See Albert Foer, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Robert H. Lande and Joshua Wright, DOJ Has 
the Power to Crush Price Fixers: Column, USA TODAY WEEKEND, May 29-31, 2015, 
Page 11A., available at file:///C:/Users/Bob/Downloads/SSRN-id2616775%20(3).pdf  
     
26 See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public 
Competition Laws, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAW 167, 173–75 (Mads Andenas et al. 
eds., 2004). 
 
APPENDIX:       The Sherman Act Is A No-Fault Monopolization Statute: 
A Textualist Demonstration 
 
      Robert H. Lande1 and Richard O. Zerbe2 
      Draft of April 16, 2020   
       
ABSTRACT 
 
 Section 2 of the Sherman Act was designed to impose sanctions on all 
monopolies and attempts to monopolize regardless whether the firm had engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the first ever textualist 
analysis, a form of statutory interpretation vigorously championed by Justice Scalia, of 
the language in Section 2. This article analyzes contemporaneous dictionaries, legal 
treatises, and cases, and demonstrates that when the Sherman Act was passed, the 
word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired a monopoly. The term 
was not limited to monopolies acquired through anticompetitive conduct. A textualist 
analysis therefore demonstrates that Section 2 was designed to impose sanctions on all 
monopolies and attempts to monopolize.  
 
 A textualist approach to statutory construction does not imply or create 
unstated exceptions. Since Section 2 of the Sherman Act contains no explicit exception 
for a monopoly acquired without proof of anticompetitive conduct, none should be 
implied or created. Current case law requiring plaintiffs to prove the corporation 
involved had engaged in improper conduct must be overturned. 
 
 This article then briefly analyzes the practical economic implications likely to 
follow from adopting a “no-fault” approach to monopolization law. The overall 
economic effects will be shown to be uncertain, and to depend upon empirical issues 
whose net effect is speculative or ambiguous. They nevertheless provide some support 
 
1 Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The authors thank 
Neil Averitt, John Bessler, Peter Carstensen, Einer Elhague, Albert Foer, Warren Grimes, 
Herbert Hovenkamp, John B. Kirkwood, Willian Kovacic, James May, Alan J. Meese, 
Randy Stutz, Sandeep Vaheesan, Marc Winerman, participants at the University of 
Pennsylvania Oct. 11, 2019 symposium on “The Post-Chicago Antitrust Revolution”, and 
colleagues on the Faculty of the University of Baltimore School of Law, for valuable 
suggestions. All of the opinions expressed and mistakes made are solely those of the 
authors. The authors also thank Beatrice Bremer, Cassandra Brumback, Michael 
Hornzell, Nicholas Jordan and Harvey Morrell for excellent research assistance.   
 
2   Daniel J. Evans Distinguished Professor Emeritus, The Evans School, University of 
Washington; Adjunct Professor Emeritus, The University of Washington Law School.  
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for the no-fault position, and a fortiori demonstrate that the article’s textualist 
conclusions should be implemented. 
 
 The new standard would admittedly cause some costs and difficulties. For 
example, imposing sanctions on all monopolies could sometimes send a confusing or 
perverse signal to firms engaging in hard but fair competition, especially as a firm’s 
market share neared the ambiguous level required for a violation. It could enable 
competitors to file baseless lawsuits.  The transaction costs involved in imposing 
sanctions on monopolies could be significant. It also could lead to difficult remedy 
issues in cases involving natural and patent monopolies. 
 
  There are also, however, important benefits from no-fault that should outweigh 
its downsides. Imposing sanctions on all monopolies could improve economic welfare 
in many ways. It should increase innovation and international competitiveness. It 
should prevent the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly pricing and the form of 
exploitation that arises when monopolies acquire wealth from consumers. It would be 
likely to decrease the inefficiencies that result from monopolies enjoying a “quiet life”. 
It should avoid the waste that can arise as a firm struggles to attain and protect its 
monopoly, and the time and cost of Section 2 litigation. And it should tend to decrease 
income inequality.  
 
 In recent years there have been many calls, from very different parts of the 
political spectrum, for imposing sanctions on, and even breaking up, monopolies 
without inquiring whether they engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This issue has 
not, however, been analyzed seriously either from a legal or an economic perspective 
in roughly a half century. The purpose of this article is not to resolve all the relevant 
questions. Rather, its goal is to re-kindle debate about the legal and economic issues 
involved in imposing sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize under 
the Sherman Act and also, a fortiori, under Section 5 of the FTC Act. And to 





 Section 2 of the Sherman Act imposes sanctions on all monopolies and 
attempts to monopolize regardless whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct.3  To demonstrate this the article will undertake the first-ever textualist 
analysis, a form of statutory interpretation vigorously championed by Justice Scalia, 
of the language in Section 2.4 This analysis will demonstrate that when the Sherman 
 
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890). 
 
4 See id. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for any person to "monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations…”  Id.  
11 
 
Act was passed the word “monopolize” simply meant that a firm had acquired a 
monopoly.5  It was not limited to monopolies acquired through anticompetitive 
conduct.6 A textualist analysis therefore demonstrates that Section 2 imposes 
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, with no exceptions.7  
Under a textualist approach contrary case law must be overturned.8 
 
 Recent events have transformed this into a timely antitrust topic.9 Prominent 
politicians on both the left10 and right11 have called, not just for an investigation into 
whether important alleged monopolies, including Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and 
Google, have engaged in anticompetitive conduct.  They’ve simply called for 




5 See infra Section IV(A). 
 
6 See id. 
 
7 Id. A textualist analysis would not imply or create unstated exceptions. Since 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act contains no explicit exception for a monopoly secured 
without proof of anticompetitive conduct, none should be implied or created. See 
the discussion infra at Section IV( C ) and note 20. 
 
8 See the discussion infra at Section V(B). 
 
9 See infra Section VI. 
 
10 For example, Senator Warren recently said,” “We need to enforce our antitrust laws, 
break up these giant companies that are dominating big tech, big pharma, big oil, all of 
them….”  https://deadline.com/2019/10/democratic-debate-facebook-elizabeth-warren-
1202761256/    See also the discussion infra at Section VI. 
 
11 “Astonishingly, the sentiment is bipartisan. The enforcers now encircling the four most 
innovative and investor-beloved companies in America [Google, Facebook, Apple, and 
Amazon] include the Trump Justice Department; the majority Republican FTC; the 
antitrust subcommittees of both the Democratic House and Republican Senate; a posse of 
51 state and territorial attorneys general pursuing Google, and a squad of 47 AGs 
dogging Facebook.”   See  https://finance.yahoo.com/news/amazon-facebook-google-
antitrust-backlash-152518336.html  For the views of President Trump and other 
conservatives see infra at Section VI. 
 




 This article will re-examine the appropriateness of the current legal 
standards for what often is called “no-fault monopolization”.13 It will demonstrate 
that Justice Scalia’s 2004 opinion in Trinko,14 which clarified relevant case law and 
emphatically held that fault is required for a Section 2 violation,15 was wrongly 
decided.  
 
 This article will demonstrate this by employing the textualist method of 
statutory analysis.16  As background and by contrast, this article in Section II will 
first engage in a traditional or “purposivist” analysis of Section 2, relying on the 
law’s legislative history.  
 
 As Section III will explain, however, a textualist analysis instead determines 
the meaning of a law by analyzing the meaning of key statutory words and terms as 
they were used in contemporaneous dictionaries, legal treatises, prior cases, and the 
earliest cases that followed the enactment of the law.17 Most crucially, textualism 
ignores the legislative debates and committee reports that are central to a 
traditional approach to statutory analysis.18  Moreover, under a textualist analysis, 
as Justice Scalia emphasized, no exception can be read into a law unless it is 
explicitly contained in the statute.19   
 
13 See Marina Lau, infra at Section VI for the history of this term. See also Alfred F. 
Dougherty, Jr.; John B. Kirkwood; and James D. Hurwitz, Elimination of the Conduct 
Requirement in Government Monopolization Cases, 37 Washington & Lee L. Rev. 83 
(1980). 
 
14 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407, 124 S.Ct. 872, 878–79 (2004). 
 
15 For an analysis of prior Supreme Court opinions that were less clear, see discussion 
infra Section V (A). Trinko removed any possible ambiguity or doubts over whether 
anticompetitive conduct was required for a violation.  Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407, 124 S.Ct. 
at 878–79.   
 
16 For an analysis of the leading methods of statutory analysis see generally Charles 
Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. 
L. REV. 205.   
 
17 See infra Section III. 
 
18 See infra Section II. 
19 See infra Section IV ( C ). Scalia wrote: “I cannot, however, adopt the Court's 
reasoning, which seems to create an exemption for functional discounts that are 
‘reasonable’ even though prohibited by the text of the Act….. The language of the Act is 
straightforward…. There is no exception for ‘reasonable’ functional discounts that do not 




 Textualism long was advocated by Justice Scalia (with great success because, 
as Justice Kagan noted, even after his departure, “we are a generally, fairly textualist 
court”).20  Nevertheless, neither Justice Scalia nor anyone else has ever undertaken a 
textualist analysis of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to determine whether it requires 
anticompetitive conduct.21   
 
 This article undertakes this task, in Section IV. This will demonstrate that the 
Sherman Act was intended by Congress to impose sanctions on all monopolies and 
attempts to monopolize.  
 
 Section V will then discuss Supreme Court Sherman Act jurisprudence and 
other cases where the Supreme Court dramatically re-interpreted statutes after a 
long period.  It argues that, despite current case law, precedent allows the Court to 
re-interpret the Sherman Act so that it imposes sanctions on all monopolies and 
attempts to monopolize.  
 
 Section VI will briefly discuss a half century of evolving economic thinking 
about the costs and benefits of this issue. For example, imposing sanctions on all 
monopolies could sometimes send a confusing or perverse signal to firms engaging 
in hard but fair competition, especially as a firm’s market share neared the 
ambiguous level required for a violation. It could enable competitors to file baseless 
lawsuits, and the transaction costs involved at the remedy stage could be significant. 
It also could lead to special remedy issues relating to natural and patent 
monopolies.22 
 
  On the other hand, no-fault could improve economic welfare in many other 
ways. It should increase innovation and international competitiveness. It should 
prevent the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly pricing and the form of 
 
mean, that-- the law is a law. It's not up to the judges to make exceptions to the law be- 
cause-- it seems to me that-- compassion--that's-- that's not the judge's job.” Newsmaker 





textualist-court-that-reasons-more-like-scalia-than-breyer; See also Max Alderman & 
Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?, STANFORD. L. REV. ONLINE (2017), 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/spotlight-textualism-originalism/ . 
 
21 See infra Section III(C).  
 




exploitation that arises when monopolies acquire wealth from consumers. It would 
be likely to decrease the inefficiencies that result from monopolies enjoying a “quiet 
life”, and also the waste that arises as firms attain and protect their monopolies. It 
should reduce the time and costs of Section 2 litigation.  And it will decrease income 
inequality.23  
 
 The overall economic effects of no-fault depend upon empirical issues whose 
net effect is speculative or ambiguous. Nevertheless, all told economic analysis 
offers some support for the no-fault position.24 
 
 Many of these economic uncertainties can be addressed optimally by 
selecting suitable remedies, and there are a variety of remedies available in Section 
2 cases. Historically, relatively few monopolies have been broken up, and we expect 
that even fewer would be remedied this way under a no-fault theory. In other 
words, even though liability should be determined on a no-fault basis, the most 
useful remedy often will be one that simply limits a firm’s conduct. 
 
 Section VII will discuss the effects this article’s conclusions should have on 
case outcomes under the “monopolization and “attempt to monopolize” portions of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  It will also briefly discuss why, a fortiori, no-fault 
monopolization should constitute a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 
 
 The concluding section of this article calls for a renewed debate over the 
legal and economic issues likely to arise from a textualist analysis of Section 2 and 
its no-fault conclusion. And to demonstrate that the article’s textualist result also 




II. A Traditional or Purposivist Legislative History Approach: Using Congressional 
Debates and Committee Reports25 
 
 
23 See infra Section VI (B). 
 
24 See infra Section VI (F). 
 
25  Author Lande is not a textualist.  He believes that legislative debates should be 
considered when courts determine the meaning of statutes.  See Robert H. Lande,  
“Wealth Transfers as the original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged,” 34 HASTINGS L. J. 65 (1982). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2065413 [hereinafter “Wealth 
Transfers”]. However, the only relevant question is whether a majority of the Supreme 




  To better explain and contrast this article’s textualist analysis, this section 
will undertake a traditional "purposivist"26 legislative history analysis that examines 
relevant legislative debates.27  As this will demonstrate, however, this produces an 
inconclusive result.28  
 
 There appears to be only one reference in the Sherman Act legislative 
debates or committee reports relevant to the question of whether Section 2 requires 
anticompetitive conduct.29  It is part of an exchange that took place at the very end 
of the debates. Senator Kenna asked:  
 
 Is it intended by the committee, as the section seems to indicate, that if an 
 individual... by his own skill and energy, by the propriety of his conduct 
 generally, shall pursue his calling in such a way as to monopolize a trade, his 
 action shall be a crime under this proposed act? . . . “Suppose a citizen of 
 Kentucky is dealing in shorthorn cattle and by virtue of his superior skill in 
that  particular product it turns out that he is the only one in the United States to 
whom  an order comes from Mexico for cattle of that stock for a considerable period, 
so  that he is conceded to have a monopoly of that trade with Mexico, is it 
intended  by the committee that the bill shall make that man a culprit? 30     
 
 
26  A traditional analysis of the legislative history of a statute, one that relied upon he 
congressional debates and Committee Reports, is often called a “purposivist” analysis 
today.  See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes In Common law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 
(2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2023527;  See Antonin Scalia 
& Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 18  
(Thompson/West 2012) (“So-called purposivism, which has been called ‘the basic 
judicial approach these days... .’”). 
 
27  A traditional legislative history analysis has been done for the Sherman Act many 
times on a variety of Antitrust subjects, most famously by Judge Bork.  As Judge Bork 
noted, the task of ascertaining the will of Congress should be “an attempt to construct the 
thing we call ‘legislative intent’ using conventional methods of collecting and reconciling 
the evidence provided by the Congressional Record.” Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and 
the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 7 n.2 (1966). For a conventional 
legislative history analysis that reaches a very different result from Bork, see Lande, 
Wealth Transfers, supra note 21.  
 
28 See infra Section II. 
 
29 Author Lande found only a single reference, which is analyzed in this Section. Nor 
have other conventional legislative history analyses revealed any other exchanges that 
concern the no-fault issue.  See, e.g. Bork, supra note 27. 
 




 Senator Edmunds gave a direct response to Senator Kenna’s hypothetical:   
 
 [I]n the case stated the gentleman has not any monopoly at all.  He has not 
got the  possession of all the horned cattle in the United States . . .  He has not 
done  anything but compete with his adversaries in trade, if he had any, to furnish 
the  commodity for the lowest price.   So I assure my friend he need not be 
disturbed  upon that subject.31  
 
Senator Edmund’s response indicates that he believed that no monopolization was 
involved in the hypothetical, so he did not really consider the need for an exception 
for a firm that achieved its monopoly solely by superior skill.  Senator Hoar then 
gave his answer:   
 
 [I]n the case put by Senator Kenna, if] . . . a man who merely by superior skill 
and  intelligence, a breeder of horses or raiser of cattle, or manufacturer or artisan 
of  any kind, got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he 
could  was not a monopolist, [unless] it involved something like the use . . . [of 
unfair]  competition like the engrossing, the buying up of all other persons 
engaged in the  same business. 32    
 
 Senator Edmunds than provided the final answer that was given to Senator 
Kenna’s question:  
 
 I have only to say . . . that this subject was not lightly considered in the 
 committee, and that we studied it with whatever little ability we had, and the 
best  answer I can make to both my friends is to read from Webster’s Dictionary 
the  definition of the verb ‘to monopolize’:  1. To purchase or obtain possession of 
the  whole of, as a commodity or goods in market, with the view to appropriate or 
 control the exclusive sale of, as, to monopolize sugar or tea. “Like the sugar 
trust.   One man, if he had capital enough, could do it just as well as two.  2.  To 
engross  or obtain by any means the exclusive right of, especially the right of 
trading to  any place, or with any country or district; as, to monopolize the India 
or Levant  trade.... [W]e were not blind to the very suggestions which have been 
made, and  we thought we had done the right thing in providing, in the very 
phrase we did,  that if one person instead of two, by a combination, of one 
person alone, as we  have heard about the wheat market in Chicago, for instance, 
did it, it was just as  offensive and injurious to the public interest as if two had 
combined to do it.” 33        
 
 
31 See id. at 3151–52 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
 
32 Id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar). 
 




 The Sherman Act, making it illegal to "monopolize" or "attempt to 
monopolize” was then passed by the Senate.34      
 
 It is difficult to reconcile the statements of Senators Edmunds and Hoar.  
They appear to have been defining the markets differently.35 Senator Edmunds was 
discussing a large cattle sale to Mexico while Senator Hoar was discussing all of the 
cattle in the U.S.36 
 
 Alternatively, they may have provided different answers to Senator Kenna’s 
question.  Senator Hoar did not consider a firm to be guilty of “monopolization” if it 
“got the whole business” by skill and efficiency alone.37  Senator Edmunds, however, 
defined “to monopolize” as merely “[t]o engross or obtain by any means . . .”38  
Edmunds believed that “if one person . . . did it, it was just as offensive and injurious 
to the public interest as if two had combined to do it.”39  Edmunds clearly 
condemned every monopoly, although by his first response he did not consider the 
hypothetical situation given to describe a monopoly.40   
 
 These contradictory statements should be construed as offsetting one 
another, and Edmonds statement shows the issue was considered but did not result 
in a change in statutory language.41 Thus, there is no evidence of a clear intent of 
Congress that anticompetitive conduct is required for a Section 2 violation.  
Nevertheless, if a judgment had to be made, since Senator Edmunds spoke last and 
was one of the main sponsors of the bill,42  his statements could be considered to 
carry slightly greater weight.  So perhaps this dialogue should be considered as 
some support for the no-fault interpretation.  Moreover, the fact that this discussion 
 
34 See id. at 3152.   
 
35 See statement of Senator Edmonds supra note 31; Statement from Senator Hoar supra 
note 32. 
 
36 See id. 
 
37 See id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar). 
 




40 See id. at 3151. 
 
41 See statement of Senator Edmonds supra note 31; Statement from Senator Hoar supra 
note 37. 
 




took place at the very end of the Sherman Act debate also could very well mean that 
it embodied Congress’ final view on the subject.  So perhaps Senator Edmonds’ 
opinion, for this reason also, should be given even more weight.  Alternatively, one 
could conclude that because these remarks were given so late in the debates, these 
statements were less able to be corrected or opposed by Senator Sherman or other 
legislators, so perhaps they should be accorded less weight.  
 
 In summary, a conventional legislative history analysis of the issue does not 
give a clear indication of Congressional intent. 
 
 
III. "Textualist" Analysis43 
 
A.  Defining A Textualist Analysis: What Would Justice Scalia Do? 
 
 Justice Scalia long was the chief advocate of a method of interpreting 
legislation known as the "textualist", originalist, fair meaning or plain meaning 
approach.44  He  often has been was joined in this methodology by other Supreme 
Court Justices,45  and Justice Gorsuch recently told the Federalist Society he has 
become Scalia’s proud successor:  
 
Tonight, I can report that a person can be both a publicly committed originalist 
and textualist and be confirmed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Originalism has regained its place at the table of constitutional interpretation, and 
textualism in the reading of statutes has triumphed. And neither one is going 
anywhere on my watch.46 
 
43 Some of the textualist analysis in this section first appeared in Robert H. Lande, A 
Traditional And Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft 
From Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349 (2013). 
 
44  See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997, 
Princeton University Press) (hereafter "Interpretation"); and Scalia & Garner, supra 
note 22, at 23. Justice Scalia makes an important distinction: "Textualism should not 
be confused with so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism 
that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute.  I am not a strict constructionist, 
and no one ought to be–though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist.  A text 
should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should 
be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means."  
 
45  For examples see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 
VA. L. REV. 157 (2018). 
 
46 See Elizabeth Slattery & Tiffany Bates, Neil Gorsuch Just Finished Year 1 on the 




 Justice Scalia expressly rejected the use of such traditional legislative 
history sources as the debates in Congress and the reports of congressional 
committees.47   He explained:  
 
In any major piece of legislation, the legislative history is extensive, 
and there is something for everybody.  As Judge Harold Leventhal 
used to say, the trick is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick 
out your friends.  The variety and specificity of result that legislative 
history can achieve is unparalleled.48   
 
He explained further:  
 
Why would you think this [material, the legislative debates and 
Committee Reports] is an expression of the legislature's intent?  And 
the more you use that garbage, the less accurate it is. What-- one of-- 
one of the major-- functions of-- of-- of hot shot Washington lawyers is 
drafting legislative history. You send it up to the hill, and get a friendly 
Senator to read it into the record or something else, to change the 





  "To say that I used legislative history is simply, to put it bluntly, a lie." Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Scalia Weighs In on Posner’s Controversial Book Review, Calls Posner’s 





48 Scalia, Interpretation, infra note 44, at 36. “[I]t is simply incompatible with 
democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning 
of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by that the lawgiver 
promulgated….      It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.” Id. at 17. 
“Only a day or two ago–when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I was 
indiscreet enough to say I don’t care what their intention was. I only want to know 
what the words mean.”  And I agree with Holmes’s other remark, quoted 
approvingly by Justice Jackson: “We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we 
ask only what the statute means.”  Id. at 22–23 (footnotes omitted). 
 
49 Newsmaker Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Bryan A. Garner Interview, 





 Instead, Justice Scalia attempted to ascertain the "plain meaning" of the text of 
statutes by making extensive use of such material as roughly contemporaneous 
dictionaries and legal decisions to define key terms.50 Justice Scalia also examines the 
country's history at approximately the time of the legislation and the legislation's societal 
context to help define the particular words or phrases in the statutes.51   
 If Justice Scalia's textualist analysis were applied to the Sherman Act, neither 
its Congressional debates nor the Committee Reports would be analyzed.52  A 
textualist analysis would, by contrast, undertake a number of inquiries to ascertain 
what the statute “originally” and “plainly” meant.53  To do this the inquiry would 
examine: 
 
 1. The definitions of the key terms in dictionaries (Justice Scalia seems 
especially interested in the definitions of key words in contemporary dictionaries54) 
legal dictionaries, and legal treatises that existed when these laws were passed.  
Ideally, we would find and analyze sources defining these terms as close as possible 
to when the Sherman Act was passed.55   
 
 2.  English common law pre-1890 cases should be examined to determine 
whether the federal Antitrust statutes borrowed key terms from the common law 
and, if so, what they meant in common law decisions.56  We could also make 
 
 
50 See Scalia & Garner supra note 26.  
51  Scalia distinguishes his approach from a traditional legislative history approach: 
"[A]ny legal audience knows what legislative history is. It's the history of the enactment 
of the bill. It's the floor speeches. It's the prior drafts of committees. That's what 
legislative history is. It isn't the history of the times. It's not what people thought it meant 
immediately after its enactment.51" (emphasis added)  See Interview, supra note 47. 
52 See Scalia & Garner, supra note 26, at 369 refer to: "The false notion that committee 
reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory interpretation." 
 
53 Id.   
 
54  Immediately after Scalia & Garner introduce the "fair reading" method, on page 33, 
they cite three sources on guides to statutory interpretation, and then, as examples of 
permissible and useful sources of meaning, 4 dictionary definitions of key terms.  Id. at 
37.  
 
55 Id. at 78: "Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted." See 
generally id., Appendix A, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, pages 415–24. 
 
56 "53. Cannon of Imputed Common-Law Meaning: A statute that uses a common-law 
term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning."  Scalia & Garner, supra note 
21 
 
inferences from state Antitrust statutes that existed when the federal Antitrust laws 
were passed, and their interpretations in courts, in case the federal laws borrowed 
key terms from a state statute.57 
    
 3.  Another inquiry would be into how federal antitrust cases from the 1890s 
used key terms to help determine "what people thought it meant immediately after 
its enactment."58   
 
 4.  A textualist analysis also would consider the "history of the times".59  It 
therefore would use the history of the period producing the antitrust laws to help 
 
26, at 320. See note 69, infra, where Justice Scalia cited, with apparent approval, a pre-
Sherman Act common law antitrust case. 
 
57 In District of Columbia V. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Justice Scalia examined 
roughly contemporaneous state constitutional provisions and statutes to help determine 
what various terms in the Second Amendment meant: "Nine state constitutional 
provisions written in the 18th century or the first two decades of the 19th, which 
enshrined a right of citizens to ‘bear arms in defense of themselves and the state’ or ‘bear 
arms in defense of himself and the state.’.... That was also the interpretation of those state 
constitutional provisions adopted by pre-Civil War state courts." Id. at 584. Scalia also 
was guided by analogous state statutes: "Many colonial statutes required individual arms-
bearing for public-safety reasons—such as the 1770 Georgia law....That broad public-
safety understanding was the connotation given to the North Carolina right by that State’s 
Supreme Court in 1843....." Id. at 601. This surely is the weakest of the aids to 
interpretation because state statutes could be inconsistent with one another.    
 
58  In Heller, 554 U.S. at 605, Justice Scalia used statutory interpretations of the Second 
Amendment from the period shortly after it was adopted as a guide to determining its 
meaning.  As he explained: "We now address how the Second Amendment was 
interpreted from immediately after its ratification through the end of the 19th century....  
the examination of a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public 
understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification. That sort of 
inquiry is a critical tool of constitutional interpretation. As we will show, virtually all 
interpreters of the Second Amendment in the century after its enactment interpreted the 
amendment as we do..... The 19th-century cases that interpreted the Second Amendment 
universally support an individual right unconnected to militia service."   
 
59 Scalia & Garner, supra note 26, at 399 discuss "how the history of gun use in the 
United States helps interpret a gun control statute. Id. at 400–02.  Moreover, Scalia 
quotes, with apparent approval, Chief Justice Taney: 
 
In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any 
degree, be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual 
members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage, 
nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or 
22 
 
ascertain what Congress meant when it used terms like "monopolize" or "attempt to 
monopolize" in the Sherman Act. 
 
 5.  Finally, a textualist analysis would not imply any exemptions that are not 
plainly evident in the words of the statutes.60  If an Antitrust law contains an explicit 
exemption then of course that exemption would be respected.  But no non-explicit 
exemptions would be inferred in order to achieve some overall goal or purpose of 
the statute.61 The only very narrow exception would be one provided by the 
“absurdity doctrine” which Justice Scalia would save for technical or drafting 
errors.62   
 
opposing amendments that were offered.  The law as it passed is the 
will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that 
will is spoken is in the act itself: and we must gather their intention 
from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity 
exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, 
to the public history of the times in which it was passed.” Scalia, supra 
note 24, at 29–30 (footnote omitted) 
 
60 See Section III ( C) infra and note 20 supra.  
61 Scalia believes no exception should be inferred to achieve a greater purpose 
because: “But secondly, even if you think our laws mean not what the legislature 
enacted but what the legislators intended, there is no way to tell what they intended 
except the text. Nothing but the text has received the approval of the majority of the 
legislature and of the President, assuming that he signed it rather than vetoed it and 
had it passed over his veto. Nothing but the text reflects the full legislature's 
purpose. Nothing." The Hon. Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on 
Statutory Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1612 (Nov. 
2012). 
62 “Justice Scalia endorsed the canon, or at least what he called a “narrow version” of 
it [the absurdity doctrine]. According to the Justice, two conditions must coincide to 
justify application of the canon. First, the absurdity “must consist of a disposition 
that no reasonable person could intend.” More precisely, and quoting Joseph Story, 
“the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case [must] be so 
monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the 
application.” Mere oddity or anomaly does not suffice. Second, the absurdity must be 
“reparable by changing or supplying a particular word or phrase whose inclusion or 
omission was obviously a technical or ministerial error.” Satisfaction of these two 
conditions, the Justice said, establishes that the apparent anomaly was a drafting 
error, an error that changing or applying a particular word corrects.” (citations 
omitted)  See Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism” 92 NOTRE 





 B. Neither Justice Scalia Nor Anyone Else Has Performed a Textualist Analysis 
 of the Relevant Sherman Act Terms 
 Unfortunately, neither Justice Scalia nor anyone else has ever performed a 
textualist analysis of any of the Antitrust laws on the no-fault issue.  Justice Scalia 
authored 5 antitrust opinions,63 3 concurrences64 and 3 dissenting65 opinions in 
Antitrust cases. Most do not even come close to undertaking a textualist analysis of 
the no-fault issue.66  Nevertheless, some are instructive illustrations of textualist 
analysis. 
 For example, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California67 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority in part and dissenting in part, performed a textualist 
analysis of the term "boycott", as it was used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
exception to the Antitrust laws: 
 
 Determining proper application of § 3(b) of the McCarran–Ferguson Act to the 
 present cases requires precise definition of the word ‘boycott.’ It is a  
 
63 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Verizon Commc’ns 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 124 S.Ct. 872 (2004); City of 
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 111 S.Ct. 1344 (1991); 
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988). 
 
64 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 176, 124 S. Ct. 2359, 
2373 (2004); FTC. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992); Texaco, 
Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990). 
 
65 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) (J. Scalia, dissenting); Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) (Justice Scalia 
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Part I and delivered a dissenting 
opinion with respect to Part II); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 
451, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992) (J. Scalia, dissenting); Summit Health v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 
322, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991) (J. Scalia, dissenting). 
 
66 Most Scalia decisions did not even come close to undertaking a relevant textualist 
analysis.  See Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 111 S.Ct. 1344 (1991); F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004); FTC 
v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992); Summit Health, v. Pinhas, 500 
U.S. 322, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991). 
 
67 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 763, 800 (1993) (writing for the 




 relatively new word, little more than a century old. It was first used in 1880, 
to  describe the collective action taken against Captain Charles Boycott, an 
English  agent managing various estates in Ireland.... Thus, the verb made from 
the  unfortunate Captain's name has had from the outset the meaning it continues 
to  carry today. To ‘boycott’ means ‘[t]o combine in refusing to hold relations of 
any  kind, social or commercial, public or private, with (a neighbour), on account of 
 political or other differences, so as to punish him for the position he has taken 
up,  or coerce him into abandoning it.’68 
 
Justice Scalia then used this dictionary definition to resolve a key legal dispute.69 
This is significant because it illustrates Justice Scalia's use of a roughly 
contemporaneous dictionary definitions (he used a 1950 dictionary to define a term 
in a 1946 law), a technique that will be discussed infra. 
 The Scalia opinion that would have been most likely to have undertaken the 
relevant textualist analysis was Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko70 because the case involved the core meaning of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.  Unfortunately, Justice Scalia's opinion did not undertake a textualist analysis of 
the overall meaning of Section 2.  He instead simply cited precedent – the Grinnell 
case - for his assertion that the Sherman Act contains an exception for a monopolist 
that gains its monopoly through historical accident or superior efficiency.71   
 
 Justice Scalia extensively analyzed the term "restraint of trade" in Business 
 
68 Id. at 800–01 (quoting 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 
69 “See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 321 (2d ed. 1950) (defining 
“boycott” as “to withhold, wholly or in part, social or business intercourse from, as an 
expression of disapproval or means of coercion” (emphasis added). “As the definition 
just recited provides, the refusal may be imposed “to punish [the target] for the 
position he has taken up, or coerce him into abandoning it. ”…. Furthermore, other 
dictionary definitions extend the term to include a  partial boycott—a refusal to 
engage in some, but not all, transactions with the target. 
 
70 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc., supra note 10, 540 U.S. at 398.  
 
71  Id.  Justice Scalia stated: "The complaint alleges that Verizon denied 
interconnection services to rivals in order to limit entry. If that allegation states an 
antitrust claim at all, it does so under §2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 which 
declares that a firm shall not “monopolize” or “attempt to monopolize.” Id. It is 
settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the possession of monopoly 
power in the relevant market, “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power 
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 




Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp72 using a common-law based textualist 
analysis, but he was not examining the no-fault issue. Rather, he distinguished the 
idea of a "restraint of trade" from the understanding of which specific business 
practices restrained trade.73  His opinion considered the common law antecedents 
of modern Antitrust law but did not involve the no fault issue.74 
 
 Finally, although it did not discuss the issue of no-fault monopoly, it is 
instructive that in a concurring opinion in Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck,75 a Robinson-
Patman Act case, Justice Scalia wrote: 
 
 The language of the Act is straightforward: Any price discrimination whose  
 effect “may be substantially ... to injure, destroy, or prevent competition” is 
 prohibited, unless it is immunized by the “cost justification” defense, i.e., unless 
 it “make[s] only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,  
 sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which 
``[the] commodities are . . . sold or delivered. There is no exception for 
``“reasonable” Functional discounts that do not meet this requirement.76  
 
This textualist discussion is noteworthy because it affirms the “fair reading” 
conclusion that no exception should be implied in the law unless it is explicitly a 
part of the statute.  (This will be important infra Section II(B)(3) during the 
discussion of whether Section 2 of the Sherman Act actually contains an "exception" 
for monopolies attained by superior efficiency).  
 
 
72 Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (1988).   
 
73 "In resting our decision upon the foregoing economic analysis, we do not ignore   
common-law precedent concerning what constituted ‘restraint of trade’ at the   
time the Sherman Act was adopted....” The Sherman Act adopted the term “restraint of 
trade” along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely 
the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890...." Id. at 733.  
 
Justice Scalia also cited, with apparent approval, a pre-Sherman Act common law case: 
"The changing content of the term “restraint of trade” was well recognized at the time the 
Sherman Act was enacted. See Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409, 9 S.Ct. 
553, 557 (1889).”  Id. at 731–32.  
 
74 "Of course the common law, both in general and as embodied in the Sherman Act, does 
not lightly assume that the economic realities underlying earlier decisions have changed, 
or that earlier judicial perceptions of those realities were in error.... "Id. at 732–33. 
 
75 Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990). 
 




 Justice Gorsuch has written one Supreme Court opinion (a dissent in Apple Inc. v. 
Pepper77 )  and three Circuit Court opinions that substantively address § 2 of the Sherman 
Act.78  None perform a textualist analysis of the no-fault issue. The majority opinion 
in Apple Inc. does include a textualist analysis by Justice Kavanaugh, but it concerns the 




IV. A Textualist Analysis of Section 2 Shows That It Does Not Require Fault 
 
A.  A Textualist Analysis of “Monopolize” 
  
 The use of Justice Scalia’s textualist analysis of the Sherman Act’s approach to 
the no-fault issue leads to a startling result.  Section 2 should be interpreted to 
prohibit all monopolies, not just monopolies acquired by anticompetitive conduct. 
The Sherman Act should not contain an exception for efficient monopolists or for 
firms that achieved their monopoly by historical accident. Nor should it require that 
the offending monopoly have monopoly power. 
 
 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anyone who shall "monopolize or 
attempt to monopolize...” 80  The statute never defines "monopolize”, 81  and uses it 
in place of the more straightforward term "monopoly".  It is difficult to know 
whether "monopolize" was intended to mean the same thing as "monopoly", was 
meant to be a broader or narrower term, or had a different meaning.   
 
 The key question is whether the statute's prohibition against firms that 
"monopolize" or “attempt to monopolize” was intended to encompass only the 
 
77  Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 203 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
 
78  Kay Elec. Co-op. v. City of Newkirk, Okla., 647 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2011); Four 
Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 1216 (10th 
Cir. 2009); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 
79  Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1525–26. 
 
80 See 15 U.S.C. 2 (1890). 
 
81 Indeed, it was rare for pre-Sherman Act restraint of trade cases to use the term 
“monopolize.” For an exception see Leslie v. Lorillard 1888 65 Sickels 519110 N.Y. 
51918 N.E. 363 (“Corporations…. if allowed to engage without supervision, in 
subjects of enterprise foreign to their charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to 
control and monopolize the avenues to that industry in which they are engaged, 




subset of conduct that created a monopoly through anticompetitive means (the 
current legal requirement for a Section 2 violation).82  A "fair meaning" or textualist 
approach to Section 2 leads to a simple conclusion: a firm illegally "monopolizes" if 
it was a monopoly at the time of the suit, and it engages in an illegal “attempt to 
monopolize” if it was in the process of attempting to acquire a monopoly.  The 
statute contains no exception for a monopoly acquired through superior efficiency 
or historical accident.83  
 
 1. Roughly Contemporaneous Dictionaries 
 
 As noted earlier, Justice Scalia was especially interested in the definitions of 
key words in contemporary dictionaries.84  Serendipitously, a contemporary 
dictionary was cited during the Sherman Act's legislative debates, just before the 
final vote.85  Senator Edmunds cited a dictionary to define the term "monopolize". 
Although normally a textualist approach would not care about anything uttered 
during a Congressional debate, Senator Edmund's remarks should be particularly 
significant to a textualist because he said that Congress should employ in the 
Sherman Act the meaning of "monopolize" as it was used in a contemporary 
Webster’s dictionary: 
 
 I have only to say... that this subject was not lightly considered in the 
committee,  and that we studied it with whatever little ability we had, and the best 
answer I  can make to both my friends is the read from Webster's dictionary the 
definition  of the verb "to monopolize":  1. To purchase or obtain position of the 
whole of, as  a commodity or goods in the market, with the view to appropriate or 
control the  exclusive sale of; as, to monopolize sugar or tea.... 2. To engross or 
obtain by any  means the exclusive rights of, especially the right of trading to 
any place, or with  any country or district....86 
 
 
82 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).  
 
83 See 15 U.S.C. 2 (1890). 
 
84  As noted earlier, immediately after Scalia & Garner introduce the "fair reading" 
method, on page 33, they cite 3 sources on guides to statutory interpretation, and then, as 
examples of permissible and useful sources of meaning, 4 dictionary definitions of key 
terms.  Id. at 37.  They also have an Appendix titled, “A Note on the Use of 
Dictionaries”, starting on page 415. 
 
85 See 21 Cong. Rec. 3153 (1890).   
 
86  Id. This is part of the exchange that took place at the very end of the Sherman Act 




This shows that "monopolize" simply meant to acquire a monopoly.87  The definition 
was not restricted to acquisitions of monopoly status through anticompetitive 
conduct. 88  It was, moreover, essentially the same as the definitions in 1898, 1828 
and 1913 editions of Webster’s Dictionary that are available online.89 
 
These definitions are essentially identical to that in the Oxford English Dictionary of 
1908:  
 
 To Get into one’s hands the whole stock of (a particular commodity); to gain 
or  hold exclusive possession of (a trade); to engross.. To have a monopoly”….To 




87 See id. 
 
88 It is, however, possible that the “with the view to” language could excuse an 
accidental monopoly, if there could be such a thing. 
89  “MONOP'OLIZER, noun One that monopolizes; a person who engrosses a commodity 
by purchasing the whole of that article in market for the purpose of selling it at an 
advanced price; or one who has a license or privilege granted by authority, for the sole 
buying or selling of any commodity. The man who retains in his hands his own produce 
or manufacture, is not a monopolist within the meaning of the laws for preventing 




“1. To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of any commodity or goods in 
 the market, with the view of selling them at advanced prices, and of having 
the power of commanding the prices; as, to monopolize sugar or tea. 2.  To engross 
or obtain b any means the exclusive right of trading to any place, and the sold power 
of vending any commodity or goods in a particular place or  country; as, to 
monopolize the India or Levant trade.3. To obtain the whole; as, to monopolize 
advantages” See 2 Noah Webster, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
727 (1828).. 
 
Mo*nop"o*lize … [From Monopoly.] To acquire a monopoly of; to have or get the 
exclusive privilege or means of dealing in, or the exclusive possession of; to engross the 
whole of; as, to monopolize the coffee trade; to monopolize land.  
https://www.websters1913.com/words/Monopolize 
 





These definitions also are in relevant part identical to the definitions in five other 
roughly contemporaneous dictionaries.91  In sum, all 10 roughly contemporaneously 
dictionaries define “monopolize” as simply to mean to gain a monopoly. None 
restricts the definition to a monopoly gained by anticompetitive conduct. 
 
 
 2.  Roughly Contemporaneous Legal Treatises 
The only available contemporary legal treatises that define “monopolize” contain 
virtually the same definition of the term.  This can be seen in Green’s legal treatise 
from 1889, which itself cited Webster:  
 To monopolize as defined by Webster, is 1. To purchase or obtain possession 
of  the whole of any commodity or goods in the market, with the view of selling 
them  at advanced prices, and having the power to command the prices. 2. To 
engross or  obtain by any means the exclusive right of trading to any place, and 
 
91 See John Craig, Monopolize, UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY, COMPRISING THE 
ETYMOLOGY, DEFINITION, AND PRONOUNCIATION OF ALL KNOWN WORDS IN THE LANGUAGE, AS 
WELL AS TECHNIAL TERMS USED IN ART, SCIENCE, LITERATURE, COMMERCE, AND LAW 174 
(Routledge and Sons, eds., 1869) (“MONOPOLIZE, mo-nop’o-lize, v. u. To engross so 
as to have the sole power, or exclusive privilege of vending any commodity. 
MONOPOLIZER, mo-nop’o-li-zur, One who engrosses a commodity by purchasing 
the entire article, with a view to enhance the price.”)  
 
See Nashua, N. H.: C. C. Parker., Monopolize, THE NEW EXCELSIOR DICTIONARY 
183. (Nashua, N. H.: C. C. Parker, eds., 1889) (“Monopolize, (mou-op'ol-lg) v.  to 
engross the whole). 
 
 See Hurst, Thomas D., Monopolize, THE AMERICAN POPULAR DICTIONARY: CONTAINING 
EVERY USEFUL WORD TO BE FOUND IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE; WITH ITS TRUE MEANING, 
DERIVATION, SPELLING, AND PRONUNCIATION. ALSO, A VAST AMOUNT OF ABSOLUTELY 
NECESSARY INFORMATION 196. (Hurst & co., eds., 1879) (“Monopolize (mo-nop'o-lïz),v. 
to obtain or engross the whole.”) 
 
Sullivan’s Dictionary of the English Language, APA Citation, Sullivan, R, Monoplize, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS, AND FOR GENERAL REFERENCE 
179 (A. Thom & sons., eds., 1854) (“Monopolize, v. to engross all of a commodity or 
business into one's own hands. Monop'olizer, s. a monopolist.”) 
 
Johnson, S, Monopolize, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 247. (London: 
Longmans, Green, eds. 1882) (“Monopolize: Engross, so as to have the sole power or 




the sole  power of vending any commodity or goods in a particular place or 
country.92   
See also the 1897 edition of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary which did not directly define 
“monopolize” but effectively defined the term when it discussed a related term, 
“forestalling the market”: 
 
 In the United States forestalling the market takes the form of “corners” or of 
 “trusts,” which are attempts by one person or a conspiracy or combination of 
 persons to monopolize an article of trade or commerce, or to control or 
regulate,  or to restrict its manufacture of production in such a manner as to 
enhance the  price; ” 93 
 
Other roughly contemporaneous legal dictionaries such as Black’s Law Dictionary 
defined “monopoly” but not ‘monopolize.”94 
 
 3.  Roughly Contemporaneous Antitrust Cases 
 Pre-Sherman Act common law antitrust cases must be interpreted with caution 
because the legal standards were changing. As Professor Letwin concluded: “as a federal 
judge observed….[in 1892] the English common law on monopolies has for some years 
been drifting towards greater leniency while ‘in the United States there is a tendency to 
revive, with the aid of legislation, the strict rules of the common law against all forms of 
monopoly or engrossing.”95  Moreover, the pre-Sherman Act common law antitrust cases 
 
92   Sanford Moon Green, Monopolize, CRIME: NATURE, CAUSES, TREATMENT AND 
PREVENTION 309 (1889) (emphasis omitted); Ewell, Marshall D. 1 ESSENTIALS OF THE 
LAW 617 (1889).  
 
93  See John Bouvier, BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 826 (1897)(citing 78 Ind. 487; 68 N. 
Y. 558; A. & E. Encyc. See Trust). 
 
94  Black’s Law Dictionary, 1st Edition from 1891, only has the term “monopoly”: “A 
privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, 
consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on a particular business or 
trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of the whole supply of a 
particularly commodity….”  Monopoly, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891).  The 
1856 edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Revised 6th Edition (1856), also contains 
only “monopoly”. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1856), 
http://www.dict.org/bin/Dict?Form=Dict2&Database=bouvier&Query=MONOPOLY
. 
Alexander Burrills Jurisprudence of the United States (1867) also does not define 
the word “monopolize”. 
 
95 Id. at 904, quoted from Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 Fed. 562, 566 (C.C.D. Mass 1892) 
(Putnam, J).  These lower court cases came down on both sides of the no fault issue. 
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are of limited relevance because we found only one that used the term “monopolize” (it 
did so a manner consistent with a no-fault approach).96  We also note that some common 
law cases stated that if entry was easy a firm could not be a “monopoly”97 but others did 
not. 98 
 
See Letwin at 901–14.  For example, an 1891 District Court case, American Biscuit & 
Mfg. Co. v. Klotz,  Circuit Court, E.D. Louisiana. January 8, 1891, 44 F. 721, 724–25, 
held that the concern of Section 2 was simply whether defendant held a monopoly: 
"[T]he law-maker has used the word [monopolize] to mean ‘to aggregate‘ or 
‘concentrate‘ in the hands of few, practically, and, as a matter of fact, and according 
to the known results of human action, to the exclusion of others.... Now it is to be 
observed that these statutes outline an offense, but require for its complete 
commission no ulterior motive, such as to defraud, etc....” Id. at 725. This court thus 
appeared to expressly reject the need for anticompetitive conduct.  The opinion 
continued:” The offense is defined to…. ‘to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, 
any of the trade or commerce.’ To compass either of these things, with no other 
motive than to compass them, and by any means, constitutes the offense.”     
 
96  Leslie v. Lorillard 1888 65 Sickels 519110 N.Y. 51918 N.E. 363 
 (“Corporations…. if allowed to engage without supervision, in subjects of enterprise 
foreign to their charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to control 
and monopolize the avenues to that industry in which they are engaged, they 
become a public menace.”). 
  
97 For examples of cases requiring monopoly power see Diamond Match Co. Roeber, 
106 N.Y. 473 (1887) (“But the business is open to all others, and there is little danger that 
the public will suffer harm from lack of persons to engage in a profitable industry. Such 
contracts do not create monopolies.”);  Chappel v. Brockway 1839 21 Wend. 157 (“That 
is certainly a new kind of monopoly which only secures the plaintiff in the exclusive 
enjoyment of his business as against a single individual, while all the world beside are 
left at full liberty to enter upon the same enterprise.”; Watertown Thermometer Co. v. 
Pool 1889 51 Hun 15720 N.Y.St.Rep. 592 (“But the business is open to all others, and 
there is little danger that the public will suffer harm from lack of persons to engage in a 
profitable industry. Such contracts do not create monopolies.”); Attorney General v. 
Consolidated Gas Co. of New York 1908, 124 A.D. 401108 N.Y.S. 823 (“In no sense can 
the consolidation of the lighting companies in the city of New York into a single 
corporation be said to create such a monopoly for it gains thereby no exclusive right. The 
field is still open to any other company that can obtain the necessary consents from the 
constituted authorities, and neither the production nor the price can be arbitrarily fixed by 
the Consolidated Company.”). 
 
98 For examples of cases that did not appear to require monopoly power see Munn v. 
People of State of Illinois 1876   94 U.S. 1134; Angelica Jacket Co. v. Angelica 1906 
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 The Supreme Court decided six Sherman Act cases in the decade after the law 
went into effect.99  The overriding lesson of these cases is that the opinions used the 
terms "monopolize" and "monopoly" interchangeably.  Although none of the early cases 
explicitly said that Section 2 did not require anticompetitive conduct, by equating these 
two terms they implicitly support the no-fault approach. For example, U.S. v. E. C. 
Knight Co.100 was concerned with a "monopoly" despite the statute’s use of 
"monopolize", and implied that every monopoly that materially affected interstate 
commerce had been sanctioned by the Sherman Act:  
  The fundamental question is whether, conceding that the existence of a  
  monopoly in manufacture is established by the evidence, that monopoly  
  can be directly suppressed under the  act of Congress in the mode   
  attempted by this bill. ...in other words, when it becomes a practical  
  monopoly to which the citizen is compelled to resort and by means of  
  which a tribute can be exacted from the community -- is subject to   
  regulation by state legislative power.101  
It also is noteworthy that E. C. Knight held that what we today would define as 
“monopoly power”102  (proof of the existence of barriers to new competition) was not 
needed:  
  In the view which we take of the case, we need not discuss whether….  
  aggregations of capital may reduce prices, therefore the objection to  
  concentration of power is relieved, or, because others were theoretically  
  left free to go into the business of refining sugar, and the original   
  stockholders of the Philadelphia refineries, after becoming stockholders of 
 
121 Mo. App. 226, 98 S.W. 805;  Cravens v. Rodgers 1890 101 Mo. 24714 S.W. 106;  
Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas Co., 37 A.D. 618, 56 N.Y.S. 288 (app. Div. 1899) 
 
99 See generally William Letwin, The First Decade of The Sherman Act: Judicial 
Interpretation, 68 YALE L. J. 900 (1959). Letwin includes In Re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 
(1895) and gives the total as 7, but this case is actually about the prosecution’s use of an 
alternative to a Sherman Act proceeding.  Id. at 913–14. 
 
100 156 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 249 (1895). 
 
101 Id. at 11. The Court continued on page 17: “Nevertheless it does not follow that an 
attempt to monopolize, or the actual monopoly of, the manufacture was an attempt, 
whether executory or consummated, to monopolize commerce, even though, in order to 
dispose of the product, the instrumentality of commerce was necessarily invoked.”  
 
102 For the modern definition of “monopoly power,” see U.S. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours 
& co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956), which defines monopoly power as the power to “control 




  the American Company, might go into competition with themselves, or,  
  parting with that stock, might set up again for themselves, therefore no  
  objectionable restraint was imposed.103 
 
103
 Id. at 11.  See also Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 237 
(1899) (“Now the restraint thus imposed on themselves was only partial -- it did not 
cover the United States; there was not a complete monopoly. It was tempered by the fear 
of competition, and it affected only a part of the price. But this certainly does not take the 




Significantly, the court characterized defendant as a “monopoly” that had 
“monopolized”
104
 even though it only had 98% of the market.
105
 The Court also held 
that “all the authorities agree that, in order to vitiate a contract or combination, it is not 
essential that its result should be a complete monopoly; it is sufficient if it really tends to 
that end, and to deprive the public of the advantages which flow from free 
competition.
”106 In this expansive holding the Court thus held that a company violated 




 Most of the other early Supreme Court cases also appeared to use the terms 
“monopolize” and “monopoly” interchangeably. See United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass’n,
108
 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States.
109
 Anderson v. United 
States,
110
  The remaining early cases were silent on the issue. See United States v. Joint 
Traffic Association
111
 and Hopkins v. United States.
112
  U.S. v. Standard Oil and the 
cases it cited seemed to use the term “monopoly” to even include markets where 






104 “The fundamental question is whether, conceding that the existence of a 
monopoly in manufacture is established by the evidence, that monopoly can be 
directly suppressed under the act of Congress in the mode attempted by this 
bill.... Again, all the authorities agree that, in order to vitiate a contract or 
combination, it is not essential that its result should be a complete monopoly; it is 
sufficient if it really tends to that end, and to deprive the public of the advantages 
which flow from free competition.”  Id. at 11. 
 
105 The court said that “Revere produced annually about two percent of the total amount 
of sugar refined.”  Id. at 4.   
 
106 Id. at 16. 
 
107 Id.  
 
108 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n., 160 U.S. 290, 299, 300, 301 (1897). 
 
109  Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States 175 U.S. 211, 237 (1899) (“But this 
certainly does not take the contract of association out of the annulling effect of the 




B.   A Textualist Analysis of “Attempt” To Monopolize 
 We should analyze the word “attempt” as it was used in 1890 to gain 
understanding as to what Congress meant by the “attempt to monopolize” offense.  
However, no unexpected or counterintuitive result comes from this examination.114 For 
example the 1908 Oxford English Dictionary reads: 115 
   1. attempt… A putting forth of effort to accomplish what is uncertain or  
  difficult; a trial, essay, endeavour; effort, enterprise, undertaking....               
  2. attempt, …To endeavour, try, essay.... 116 
An 1898 Webster’s Dictionary gives a similar definition:     
  At-tempt… 1. To make trial or experiment of ; to try. 2. To try to   
  move, subdue, or overcome, as by entreaty. 3. To attack ; to make an  
  effort or attack upon. Syn. — See Try. At-tempt'. n. An essay, trial, or  
 
110
  Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898) (“If all engaged in the business were 
to become members of the association, yet, as the association itself does no business, it 
can and does monopolize none.”). 
111  United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, 509 (1898). 
 
112  Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898).  
 
113  See Standard Oil and the cases it cited, note 162 infra. A pre-Sherman Act case,  
Munn v. People of State of Illinois 94 U.S. 1134 (1876), essentially equated 
monopoly and “virtual monopoly”: “something had occurred which led the whole 
body of the people to suppose that remedies such as are usually employed to 
prevent abuses by virtual monopolies might not be inappropriate here.” 
 
114  United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (“Nevertheless it does not 
follow that an attempt to monopolize, or the actual monopoly of, the manufacture was an 
attempt, whether executory or consummated, to monopolize commerce, even though, in 
order to dispose of the product, the instrumentality of commerce was necessarily 
invoked.”).  
 
115  Attempt, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE  (2019),  
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/12765?rskey=WdNqpF&result=1&isAdvanced=
false#eid (accessed June 18, 2019). 
 




  endeavor; an undertaking ; an attack, or an effort to gain a point. Syn. — 
  Attempt; endeavor; effort ; exertion; trial. At-tempt'117 
 
So do the 1828 and 1913 editions of Webster.118  These definitions are essentially 
identical to its modern definition of “attempt”.119 
 
 However, the word “attempt” in a statute had a specific meaning under the 
common law circa 1890.  It meant “an intent to do a particular criminal thing, with an act 
toward it falling short of the thing intended.”120 Although one definition stated that the 
act needed to be “sufficient both in magnitude and in proximity to the fact intended, to be 
taken cognizance of by the law that does not concern itself with things trivial and 
small.”121 none defined the magnitude or nature of the necessary acts with great 
 
117 Attempt, WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1898) 
https://ia802602.us.archive.org/1/items/websterscollegia00web/websterscollegia00web.p
df. 
118 Attempt, WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) 
https://ia802602.us.archive.org/1/items/websterscollegia00web/websterscollegia00web.p
df (“ATTEMPT…. to try; .... to strain, urge, stretch.] 1. To make an effort to effect some 
object; to make trial or experiment; to try; to endeavor; to use exertion for any purpose; 
as, to attempt to sing; to attempt a bold flight.”)  
From a 1913 Webster’s Dictionary:” At*tempt", n. An essay, trial, or endeavor; an 
undertaking; an attack, or an effort to gain a point; esp. an unsuccessful, as contrasted 
with a successful, effort…. Attempt to commit a crime (Law), such an intentional 
preparatory act as will apparently result, if not extrinsically hindered, in a crime which it 
was designed to effect….Syn. -- Attempt, Endeavor, Effort, Exertion, Trial. These words 
agree in the idea of calling forth our powers into action…. An attempt is always directed 
to some definite and specific object….  At*tempt" (?; 215), v. t….  to try; to endeavor to 
do or perform (some action); to assay; as, to attempt to sing; to attempt a bold flight…. 
Attempt, WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1913). 
 
119  Attempt, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE  (2019),  
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/12765?rskey=WdNqpF&result=1&isAdvanced=false#e
id (accessed June 18, 2019). 
 
120  JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP'S NEW CRIMINAL LAW 438–39 (8th ed., 1892). 
 
121  Id. See also SEYMOUR F. HARRIS, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 19 (1883) (“An 
attempt may be said to be the doing of any of the acts which must be done in succession 
before the desired object can be accomplished.”);  FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD, HEARD ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 385 (2d ed., 1882) (“An attempt to commit a crime is an act done with 
intent to commit that crime, and forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its 
actual commission if it were not interrupted.”); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF 
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specificity  However, it is noteworthy that in 1881 Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote about 
the attempt doctrine in his celebrated treatise, The Common Law: 
   
  Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the line… the   
  considerations being, in this case, the nearness of the danger, the greatness 
  of the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt….When a man buys  
  matches to fire a haystack…there is still a considerable chance that he will 
  change his mind before he comes to the point. But when he has struck the  
  match… there is very little chance that he will not persist to the end….122   
 
It was clear, however, that acts constituting mere preparation or planning were 
insufficient.123  
 
THE CRIMINAL LAW (Crimes and Punishments) 88 (1877) (“An attempt to commit a crime 
is an act done with intent to commit that crime, and forming part of a series of acts which 
would constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted.”); WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 
ELEMENTARY LAW 303 (1882) (“An attempt consists in the intent to commit a crime, 
combined with the doing of some act adapted to, but falling short of, its actual commission 
. . . The act done must be, in its nature, adapted to accomplish the crime intended.”). 
 
122 O. W. Holmes, Jr., “The Common Law,”68-69 (1881). See also W.M. L. CLARK, 
CLARK'S CRIMINAL LAW 126 (2nd ed., 1894) (“An attempt to commit a crime is an act 
done with intent to commit that crime, and tending to, but falling short of, its commission 
. . . The act must be such as would be proximately connected with the completed 
crime.”).  
 
123 See JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 401 (1877) 
(Describing the act as “sufficient both in magnitude and in proximity to the fact 
intended, to be taken cognizance of by the law that does not concern itself with 
things trivial and small.”); LEWIS HOCHHEIMER, CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 297, 
(2nd ed., 1904) (“In order to constitute the offense of attempt, there must be an act 
in the nature of a direct movement towards the commission of the offense and, 
concurrent with such act, an actual purpose, or specific design, to commit the 
particular crime . . . It is sufficient that one step be taken towards the commission of 
the contemplated crime, but mere preparation or planning is insufficient.”);  EDWARD 
LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA– BOOK OF 
DEFINITIONS 5 (1828) (“Attempt: An endeavor to accomplish an offense, which has 
failed from some other cause than the voluntary relinquishment of the 
design.”); JOHN WILDER MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES 23 (1881) (To constitute attempt, “it 
is necessary that some act should be done in the pursuance of the intent, 
immediately and directly tending to the commission of the crime; and act which, 
should the crime be perpetrated, would constitute part and parcel of the 
transaction, but which does not reach to the accomplishment of the original 
intent.”);  
JOHN WILDER MAY, MAY’S CRIMINAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 1893) (“An attempt is an act done in 




 Congress’s choice of the phrase, “attempt to monopolize” surely built upon the 
existing common definitions of an “attempt” to commit robbery and other crimes.124  It 
implies that Congress intended a meaning of “attempt to monopolize” far different from 
the current requirements of the offense. Although the meaning of a criminal “attempt” to 
violate a law has evolved since the common law formulations presented above,125 a 
textualist approach to the “attempt to monopolize” prong of Section 2 would move it 




C. No Exceptions Should Be Implied for Monopolization or Attempts To Monopolize 
Not Accompanied By Anticompetitive Conduct 
 
 These definitions of "monopolize" and “attempts to monopolize” include all 
monopolies, even those acquired by luck, historical accident, or superior efficiency.  
 
shall be committed, and an act done, not in the full execution, but in pursuance, of 
the intent.”); EMLIN MCCLAIN, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE. FOR THE USE OF 
STUDENTS. 85 (1883) (“[A] criminal attempt is an intent to commit a specific crime, 
coupled with an act adapted to the commission of that crime which the law regards 
as sufficiently tending to its accomplishment to be a part of it, without, in itself, 
being the consummation of the crime.”); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 561 (James Kay, et al. eds., 1846) (Defining a 
person guilty of attempt as “every person who shall attempt to commit an offense 
prohibited by law, and in such attempt shall do any act towards the commission of 
such offense, but shall fail in the perpetration, or shall be intercepted or prevented 
in the execution of the same."). 
 
124 In Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 376, 402 (1905) Justice Holmes noted the 
common law origin of the attempt to monopolize offense: “The distinction between mere 
preparation and attempt is well known in the criminal law.” (The authors are grateful to 
Marc Winerman for suggesting this research issue.) 
 
125 The adoption of the Model Penal Code has changed the classic definition of attempt. 
See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 18, 36 (1986); 4 
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 580 (15th ed., 1996). The Model Penal Code’s formulation, 
now adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, requires “an act or omission constituting a 
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in [the actor’s] commission 
of the crime.” See id. at 36; Model Penal Code § 5.01. The substantial step must be 
“strongly corroborative” of the defendant’s criminal purpose. Id. at § 5.01(2). The statute 
enumerates several examples of a “substantial step,” including “lying in wait” or 
“search[ing] for or following the contemplated victim of the crime” or “enticing or 
seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for 




Like the actual text of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the definitions contain no 
exceptions. Moreover, as Justice Scalia reminded us in Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, no 
exception should be read into a statute unless, of course, it is explicitly contained in 
the statute.126   Moreover, one of the earliest Antitrust cases, United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, explicitly held that no exceptions to the Antitrust statutes 
should be implied:  
 
 In other words, we are asked to read into the Act, by way of judicial   
 legislation, an exception that is not placed there by the lawmaking branch  
  of the Government, and this is to be done upon the theory that the  
   impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it cannot be 
supposed Congress   intended the natural import of the language it used. This 
we cannot and    ought not to do.... These considerations are, 
however, not for us. If the Act   ought to read as contended for by 
defendants, Congress is the body to    amend it, and not this 
Court, by a process of judicial legislation wholly    unjustifiable.127  
 
Since the text of Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not contain an express 
exemption for monopolies and attempts to monopolies unaccompanied by 
anticompetitive conduct, none should be implied or imposed by courts today. 
 
 
V.   Cases where the Supreme Court has dramatically re-interpreted a statute after a 
long period 
 
 A.  The Vagueness of Pre-Trinko Section 2 Law 
 
 There is no doubt that in 2004 the Supreme Court in Trinko clearly interpreted 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act as requiring that a firm engage in anticompetitive conduct  
to violate Section 2.128 Scalia’s majority opinion also contained much more praise for 
monopolies than had ever before appeared in a Supreme Court decision.129 Moreover, 
 
126 “I cannot, however, adopt the Court's reasoning, which seems to create an exemption 
for functional discounts that are ‘reasonable’ even though prohibited by the text of the 
Act….. The language of the Act is straightforward…. There is no exception for 
"reasonable" functional discounts that do not meet this requirement.” Texaco, Inc. v. 
Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 579 (1990). 
127 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897).  See also: 
"no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that which has been 
mitted by congress." Id. at 328. 





many agree with Justice Scalia that clear opinions deserve more stare decisis deference 
than ambiguous opinions.130    
 
 Trinko was different in tone and clarity, and arguably even in its overall 
holding, from the then-existing monopolization standard from the 1966 United 
States v. Grinnell Corp.131 case.  Grinnell merely held that a “willfully acquired or 
maintained”, or “consciously acquired”,132 monopoly should be condemned.  Grinnel 
added, “as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.“ 133 Grinnell usually is read 
to require anticompetitive conduct,134 and the court in Grinnell found that defendant 
in that case had engaged in “unlawful and exclusionary” behavior.135 Grinnell, 
however, never explicitly held that a Section 2 violation always requires 
anticompetitive conduct.  
 
 Indeed, Professor Donald Turner interpreted Grinnell to be ambiguous on the 
no-fault issue because it failed to properly distinguish between "exclusionary 
conduct" and "skill, foresight and industry."136 Turner found the Court’s formulation 
unhelpful because "[a]ny highly successful competitive strategy tends to confer 
market power and tends to 'exclude' competitors, and everyone who engages in 
such strategy knows this; thus, power obtained and maintained by any highly 
 
130 See Brett N. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 
2119 (2016).  
131 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (“The offense of 
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of 
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident…”).   
132  Note 7 reads: “Since the record clearly shows that this monopoly power was 
consciously acquired, we have no reason to reach the further position of the District 
Court that, once monopoly power is shown to exist, the burden is on the defendants to 





135  “And, as the facts already related indicate, this monopoly was achieved in large part 
by unlawful and exclusionary practices . . .”  Id.  
 
136 Donald Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 




successful competitive strategy is 'willfully' acquired."137  Turner stated: "I have 
come to believe, contrary to my earlier expressed views, that courts can fairly be 
asked to extend the scope of the Sherman Act's application [to include no-fault 
cases]."138 Ultimately, however, Turner concluded Grinnell suggested that monopoly 
"solely attributable to accident" should not be an offense.139 This approach was 
included in the 1978 Areeda-Turner treatise which advocated monopolization 
without a demonstration of fault, with important qualifications that made their 
proposal closer to a presumption of illegality than to true no-fault. 140 
 
 Similarly, the immediately prior relevant Supreme Court decision, the 1948 
United States v. Griffith
141
 standard, was also somewhat ambiguous on the fault issue: 
    It is, however, not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain   
 trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the antitrust laws have   
 been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly results   
 as the consequence of a defendant's conduct or business     
 arrangements….To require a greater showing would cripple the Act.142   
The Court then continued with an ambiguous quote from Swift & Co. v. United States: 
 Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law 
 seeks to prevent -- for instance, the monopoly -- but require further acts in 








140 See the discussion of the 1978 Areeda/Turner proposal in Areeda & Hovenkamp, 3 
ANTITRUST LAW 71, item 3, (4th ed. 1978).  
 
141  334 U.S. 100 (1948). 
142 Id. The opinion continued: “As stated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416, 432, ‘no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is 
doing.’ Specific intent in the sense in which the common law used the term is necessary 
only where the acts fall short of the results condemned by the Act.”  Similarly, in  
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, a conspiracy to monopolize case, the Court held 
that “[n]either proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of 
existing or potential competitors is essential to sustain a charge of monopolization under 
the Sherman Act.” 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946). 
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 it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will 
 happen.143 
 Similarly, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, a conspiracy to monopolize 
case, the Court held that “[n]either proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of 
actual exclusion of existing or potential competitors is essential to sustain a charge of 
monopolization under the Sherman Act.”144 Two years later, the Court in Schine Chain 
Theatres, Inc. v. United States, read Alcoa as holding that “[t]he mere existence of the 
power to monopolize, together with the purpose or intent to do so, constitutes an evil at 
which the Act is aimed.”145 
 One could reasonably conclude that the Grinnell and Griffith Courts, in 
opinions written by Justice Douglas – certainly no fan of monopolies – was being 
deliberately vague and arguably self-contradictory.146 Perhaps Justice Douglas was 
knowingly and deliberately preserving the ambiguity of the then-prevailing Alcoa 
standard,147 which could be read either as requiring fault, as not requiring fault, or 
as a cleverly disguised no-fault standard.148   
 
143 Id. 
144 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).   
 
145 Id. 334 U.S. 110, 130 (1948) 
 
146 See supra notes 131-141 and accompanying text. 
  
147
 See United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).  
 
148
  The court in Berkey Photo called “the cryptic Alcoa opinion a litigant's wishing well, 
into which, it sometimes seems, one may peer and find nearly anything he wishes.”  603 
F. 3d 267, 273 (1979). The Court continued to explain the contradictory nature of Alcoa: 
“Having stated that Congress "did not condone `good trusts' and condemn `bad' ones; it 
forbad all," Alcoa, supra,148 F.2d at 427, he declared with equal force, "The successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins," id. at 
430.”     
Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan criticized United States v. Alcoa in an 
essay published in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. in part because he believed that it 
was a no-fault case: “ALCOA is being condemned for being too successful, too efficient, 
and too good a competitor….”  
See generally William E. Kovacic & Marc Weinerman,  Learned Hand, Alcoa, and the 
Reluctant Application of the Sherman Act, 79 ANTITRUST L. J. 295 (2013) (From its 
abstract:  “consistent with Hand’s philosophy of legislative interpretation, the 
decision sought to implement Congressional intent as Hand perceived it – and that 
intent was sufficiently clear, Hand believed, that the public would "quite rightly, 




 As noted earlier, when Justice Scalia authored the opinion in Trinko he did 
not undertake a textualist analysis of Section 2.149  He simply cited precedent for his 
assertion that the Sherman Act contains an exception for a monopolist that gained 
its monopoly through superior efficiency.150  
 
 Nevertheless, the pro-monopoly tone of Scalia's language in Trinko went 
much further than that of any other Supreme Court monopolization opinion.151  
Elsewhere Justice Scalia has denounced the type of expansion of precedent he 
undertook in Trinko.152  We can only speculate why Justice Scalia avoided 
undertaking a textualist analysis in Trinko, but instead used to opportunity to move 
the law of monopolization even further away from the result that should follow 
from a textualist approach.   
 
 
two possible ways of dealing with [monopolies]: to regulate, or to forbid, them. 
Since we have no way of regulating them, we forbid them. I don’t think much of that 
way, but I didn’t set it up” (quoting Bench Memo, at 296).      
 
It is possible that Judge Hand wrote his opinion in a manner that was deliberately 
ambiguous on the anticompetitive conduct issue because Hand's fair reading of the 
statute (the term "textualism" didn't exist in 1945) convinced him that Section 2 
was supposed to be a no-fault statute.  Hand might have been nervous as to whether 
this interpretation would be accepted by the Supreme Court.  So he obfuscated. 
Thus, a plain or fair reading of Section 2 might help explains much of the Alcoa 
opinion. 
149 See Trinko, supra note 14. 
150 Scalia wrote: "It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’” United 
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).  
 
151 Contrast the language from earlier Supreme Court opinions, supra notes 130-40, with 
Trinko, supra note 14, at 880 : “The mere possession of monopoly power, and the 
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important 
element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least 
for a short period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk 
taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to 
innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is 
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.” 
 
152 See Conic v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1369 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) 




 B. Overturning Old Statutory Precedent 
 
 Justice Brandeis articulated the general criteria courts employ to guide their 
use of the doctrine of stare decisis:  
 
 “Stare decisis is not . . . [an] inexorable command . . . Stare decisis is   
 usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that  
  the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right . . . 
even    where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided 
correction can be    had by legislation.153   
 
  More recently, the Court noted a specific complexity relating to Antitrust: 
“[S]tare decisis [has] less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman Act,”154 
which gives courts “exceptional law-shaping authority.”155 The Court explained: “We 
have . . . felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding 
evolves and . . . reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s 
competitive consequences....”156  This is consistent with an explanations in Kahn as 
to why stare decisis matters less in Antitrust cases:  
 
 [T]he general presumption that legislative changes should be left to   
 Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the   
 accepted view that Congress expected the courts to give shape to the   
 statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition. . . . [T]he  
  Court . . . reconsider[s] its decisions construing the Sherman Act when 
the    theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called into 




153 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  
 
154 See Kimble v Marvel Entm’t., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).  For an analysis of 
this and related cases see Barak Orbach, Antitrust Stare Decisis, Antitrust Source, Oct. 
2015, at 1, passim. 
 
155 Id. at 2413. 
 
156 Id. at 2412-13.  Moreover, because the question in those cases was whether the 
challenged activity restrained trade, the Court’s rulings necessarily turned on its 
understanding of economics.     
 
157 See State Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997). 
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Leegin might have gone even a step further, stating that “[s]tare decisis is not as 
significant . . . [when] the issue before us is the scope of the Sherman Act.”158   
Moreover, in Leegin Justice Scalia voted to overturn precedent from 1911 that the 
Supreme Court in two decisions (opinions that Justice Scalia joined) re-considered 
but declined to overturn.159  Precedent that Justice Scalia ignored when he joined 
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Leegin.160 
 
 Supreme Court precedent that is 16 years old, such as the opinion by Justice 
Scalia in Trinko which unequivocally held that Section 2 requires anticompetitive 
conduct, certainly deserves deference and should not be overturned lightly.  A fortiori, a 
precedent 54 years old, such as Grinnell, deserves even more respect under stare decisis. 
However, Grinnell deserves less deference because it is ambiguous.161 
 
 The longest period after which the Supreme Court dramatically re-interpreted the 
Sherman Act apparently was 93 years, when Leegin overturned the holding in the 1911 
Dr. Miles 162 decision concerning the legal status of resale price maintenance 
(“RPM”).  In 1911 the Court interpreted the Sherman Act to make RPM per se illegal,163 




158 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007). 
But not always.  As Barak Orbach points out, some Antitrust precedent “are truly 
anomalous, yet enjoy “a super-strong presumption of correctness.” Two key examples are 
the baseball exemption and the filed-rate doctrine..... Neither doctrine can be justified 
other than by the reluctance of the Court to overrule it.” (Antitrust Stare Decisis, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 8–9 (Oct. 2015) (footnotes omitted).    
 
159 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 108 S.Ct. 1515 
(1988); Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Svc. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 
160 See Leegin, supra note 158. 
 
161 See Amy Coney Barrett, Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia's Originalism in Practice, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921, 1934 (2017). "While he did not think that specific 
dispositions were set in stone, he thought that the Court should "retain [its] ability . . 
. sometimes to adopt new principles for the resolution of new issues without 
abandoning clear holdings of the past that those principles contradict." Id. at 1934. 
 
162 See Leegin, supra note 158. 
 
163  Dr. Miles did not actually use the term “per se” because it had not yet entered 
the Antitrust lexicon.  Nevertheless, the Court in Leegin noted that Dr. Miles 
promulgated a per se opinion.  See Leegin, supra note 158. 
 
164 Leegin, supra note 158. 
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 This chance was not made, however, because the Court acknowledged it had been 
mistaken concerning the intentions of the Congress that enacted the Sherman 
Act.  Rather, the basis of their reasoning concerned evolving or changing economic 
learning concerning how often resale price maintenance (RPM) is anticompetitive.165  In 
dissent, four justices cited the importance of 96 years of precedent as an important reason 
for keeping the Dr. Miles standard.166  Stare decisis was not enough, however, for the 
Court’s majority.167  
 
 Surely the changing state of knowledge or the Court’s views as to the economics 
profession’s changing opinion over time concerning the issue of how often, or what 
percentage of the time, a practice is anticompetitive, should count for less than the 
intentions of Congress.  Surely the foremost task of the Supreme Court should be to 




VI.   The Evolving Economic Analysis 
 
 The Antitrust field has not seriously undertaken an overall economic analysis 
of the no-fault approach to monopolization law in half a century.168 Perhaps this is 







166 Id.   The dissent pointing out that the Court had never “overturned so well-established 
a statutory precedent.”17   
 
167 Id at 877. 
 
168  Justice Brandeis was the earliest prominent legal scholar to condemn all 
privately attained monopolies.  See the quotation from The Curse of Bigness, supra 
at [the first footnote in the Conclusion]. No fault’s high point came in the 1960s and 
1970s when it was advocated in large part––using their expansive interpretation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act––by a number of mainstream scholars. See Donald Turner, 
The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 
1220–21 (1969); Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, ANTITRUST LAW, Volume 3, at 63–67 
(1978). Their scholarship helped spur the first major no-fault policy initiative, President 
Johnson’s Neal Task Force, and the first no-fault bill, introduced by Senator Hart in 
1976. For an excellent analysis of these issues and an insightful history of the no 
fault movement, see Marina Lao, No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, WM. & 




 Recently, however, a significant number of prominent politicians have 
demonstrated an interest in breaking up firms they perceived as being “monopolies”––often 
without inquiring into whether they engaged in anticompetitive conduct.169 It is perhaps 
unsurprising that breaking up such possible170 monopolies such as Amazon, Facebook, and 
Google––without first finding that they engaged in anticompetitive conduct––has been 
suggested by politicians on the left of the political spectrum, including Senators Elizabeth 
Warren171 and Bernie Sanders.172 What has perhaps been surprising, in light of 
conservatives’ traditional deference towards big business, has been harsh criticism from 
the right, including from President Trump,173 and even calls for their break-up or regulation 
 
169 See infra footnotes 170-75. 
 
170 As President Trump said concerning Google and Facebook, “I think it’s a bad 
situation, but obviously there’s something going on in terms of monopoly.” Makena 
Kelly, Donald Trump on Tech Antitrust: ‘There’s Something Going On,’ THE VERGE 
(June 10, 2019, 11:51 AM),  https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/10/18659619/donald-
trump-facebook-google-amazon-apple-antitrust-european-union-eu (We make no 
judgment as to whether Google or Facebook is a monopoly. We merely note that 
some prominent politicians believe that they are.). 
 
171 Senator Elizabeth Warren promised that if elected president she would break up 
Amazon, Facebook and Google. Sean Moran, Elizabeth Warren proposes breaking up 
Amazon, Facebook, Google, BREITBART (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2019/03/08/elizabeth-warren-proposes-breaking-up-
amazon-facebook-google/.   She published a detailed plan to break up big tech 
companies, including the creation of a threshold of $25 billion in annual revenue, above 
which companies would be subject to restrictions and regulations that would require 
divesting certain portions of the company.  Elizabeth Warren, It’s time to break up 
Google, Amazon, and Facebook, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c.  
 
172 Senator Bernie Sanders, when asked whether he would break up Facebook, 
Google, and Amazon if he were elected President, responded “absolutely,” adding that he 
would appoint an attorney general “who would break up these huge corporations.”  From 
the Corner, and Cristiano Lima, Bernie Sanders said he would ‘absolutely’ try to break 
up Facebook, Google, Amazon, POLITICO (July 16, 2019, 10:41 AM)  
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/16/bernie-sanders-facebook-google-amazon-
1416786. Senator Sanders also introduced a bill that would break up the largest financial 
institutions in the United States and establish a cap on size going forward.  Press Release, 
Sen. Bernie Sanders, Sanders, Sherman Introduce Legislation to Break Up Too Big to 
Fail Financial Institutions (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sanders-sherman-introduce-
legislation-to-break-up-too-big-to-fail-financial-institutions.   
 




from a large number of other leading conservative figures, including Steve Bannon174 and 
Senator Ted Cruz.175  
 
 This article will not undertake a complete analysis of the economics of no-fault 
monopolization. This task easily could require a lengthy book. This article’s much 
more modest goal is to present an overview of many of the most important economic 
issues involved. Even this brief overview will demonstrate, however, that this is a 
topic that deserves careful analysis and debate by the antitrust community. It will 








 (“Is Fake News Washington Post being used as a lobbyist weapon against 
Congress to keep Politicians from looking into Amazon no-tax-monopoly?”). 
Trump also said he was looking at breaking up all three companies.  
https://www.axios.com/trump-big-tech-google-amazon-facebook-957600ac-2d45-
476c-a5ee-9bf534c85f80.html;   Emily Stephenson, Trump vows to weaken U.S. 
media ‘power structure’ if elected, REUTERS.COM (Oct. 22, 2016, 1:25 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-election/trump-vows-to-weaken-u-s-media-
power-structure-if-elected-idUSL1N1CS08H (“As an example of the power structure 
I’m fighting, AT&T is buying Time Warner and thus CNN, a deal we will not approve 
in my administration because it’s too much concentration of power in the hands of 
too few,’ Trump said.  He also said he would look at ‘breaking’ up Comcast’s 
acquisition of NBC Universal in 2013. Deals like this destroy democracy,’ he said.”). 
 
174 Trump’s former chief strategist and right-wing icon, Steve Bannon, called for public 
utility regulation of tech platforms like Facebook and Google. Robinson Meyer, What 




175 Robert Kraychik, Exclusive - Ted Cruz: Use Antitrust Laws to Break 'Massive Power' 
of Tech Lords to ‘Subvert our Democratic Process,’ BREITBART (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.breitbart.com/radio/2018/04/25/exclusive-ted-cruz-use-antitrust-
laws-to-break-massive-power-of-tech-lords-to-subvert-our-democratic-process/.  
For more examples of conservative and liberal politicians calling for the breakup of 
firms alleged to have monopoly power, see Robert H. Lande & Sandeep Vaheesan, 
Preventing the Curse of Bigness Through Conglomerate Merger Legislation,  AZ. ST. L. J. 





 Our analysis begins with a very brief historical overview of the evolution of 
the profession’s analysis concerning the no-fault issue, and then briefly discusses one 
of its most important economic issues: the probable effects of a no-fault policy on 
innovation.176 The article then gives an overview of its possible effects on 
international competitiveness, on allocative inefficiency, and on the prevention of 
wealth transfers from consumers to monopolies.177  The article then briefly discusses 
its possible effect on income equity and equality.178 As a part of these discussions it 
will note the inefficiencies that can arise as firms attain and protect their 
monopoly.179  
 
 The paper also will overview the downsides of this approach, including the 
possibility that it could send a confusing or perverse signal to firms engaging in hard 
but fair competition.180 It could be especially likely to discourage firms from 
competing hard when a firm’s size neared the ambiguous market share levels 
required for a violation. Moreover, at least 90% of antitrust cases are private actions, 
so a relevant question would be to ask the effects of no-fault be on such actions? 
Would it increase or decrease the degree to which the Sherman Act is used for 
protectionist business purposes? In addition, the transaction costs involved in 
sanctioning monopolies could be significantly changed under no fault. No-fault could 
also lead to special problems for natural monopolies and patent monopolies, so it 
seems virtually certain they would require conduct remedies rather than structural 
relief.181 
 
 It must be emphasized that this article will not attempt to fully analyze these 
issues, let alone to quantify them and thereby determine the overall net effects of no-
fault on economic welfare. The modest goal of this article is to encourage the antitrust 
profession to re-start the analysis and the debate over sanctioning all monopolies. 
This analysis should, moreover, be carried out mindful of the uncertainty as to its 
outcome and consequences. The indeterminacy can support arguments for either 
“no-fault” actions, or for a “no-action” at all policy as it is easy to marshal economic 
 
176 See infra Section VI (A) and (B). 
 
177 See infra Section VI (B). 
 
178 Id.  
 
179 Id.  
 
180 See infra Section VI ( C ). 
 
181 This article will not, however, undertake an extensive analysis of monopolies 
achieved through merger because, in light of the Clayton Act, this is a rarity. See 
generally Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and 




arguments on both sides. The balance of these arguments necessarily depends upon 
an evaluation of how effective and efficient antitrust policy is likely to be (including 
the number and magnitudes of false positive and false negative errors) while also 
considering litigation and other costs generated by the policy.182 We do not provide 
an answer here. We only suggest that the existing literature contains enough support 
for a no-fault position so that the doctrine is not a priori unreasonable.183 
 
 
A.  Economists’ Evolving Opinions 
 
 The Sherman Act initially had broad appeal.184 Later surveys suggest that in 
general, economists continue to favor the Act.  In a survey of a random sample of 
economists, 83% agreed that the antitrust laws should be used aggressively to reduce 
monopoly power.185  A half-century ago there were, however, plenty of opinions on the 
subject, but little evidence about the economic effects of monopolies. One of the earliest 
important attempts to determine the efficacy of antitrust was by Nobel Laureate George 
Stigler.186 In 1952 Stigler was a proponent of no-fault monopolization, although later he 
changed his view.187  Although we will not attempt to trace the evolution of economists’ 
analysis since Stigler, we note that quite recently Thomas Philippon argued that oligopoly 
is now pervasive in the U.S. and costs the typical American household more than $5,000 
 
182  These concerns are sometimes called Type 1, Type II, and Type III errors.  
See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger 
Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1580, 1670–77 (1983). 
 
183 See infra Section VI (F). 
 
184 William Letwin notes the favorable public view of the Sherman Act at the time it was 
passed. William Letwin, Congress and The Sherman Antitrust Law, 1887-1890 (1956) 23 
U. CHI. L. REV. 221. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol23/iss2/3.   Sanford 
Gordon, surveyed journal and popular press opinions before the Sherman Act was passed 
and concluded that there was considerable support for it. See also Arthur Robert Burns, 
The Antitrust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, in 4 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 301-320 (1937). 
 
185 Bruno Frey, et al., Consensus and Dissention Among Economists, (1984) 74 AM. 
ECON. REV., 986 at 986–994;  See also J. Kearl, C. Pope, G Whiting and L. Wimmer, A 
Confusion of Economists? 69 AM. ECON. REV. 30 (1979). 
 
186 George J. Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9  J. L. & ECON. 225–58 
(Oct. 1966). 
 




per year.188 The following is a brief survey of a number of possible economic effects of a 
no-fault monopoly proposal.  
 
B. Overview of Economic Effects Mostly Supporting No Fault 
 
1. Likely Effects on Innovation   
 
A trenchant argument in favor of no-fault antitrust actions lies in the evidence 
that on average monopoly retards innovation.189  By innovation, we mean both 
technological invention and better ways of doing things. Carl Shapiro’s review of the 
literature finds that “[t]he unifying principle, richly supported by the empirical 
literature, is that innovation, broadly defined, is spurred if the market is contestable; 
that is, if multiple firms are vying to win profitable future sales.”190 In other words, 
competition is usually good for innovation.  
 
As Whinston191 notes in his review of Carl Shapiro’s work, the forces 
determining innovation are complex, but market structure is itself important. The 
major thrust of the literature is that the rate of innovation tends to be greatest under 
when a market is competitive. This result is consistent with the work of Pakes, and 
McGuire192 and is illustrated in the following diagram, which shows low levels of 
innovation with very competitive markets, high R&D rate for contestable markets and 
a leveling off of innovation for markets with little competition, with monopolies 
innovating the least.    
 
188 THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL: HOW AMERICA GAVE UP ON FREE 
MARKETS  (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019). 
 
189 Joseph Schumpeter thought large firm market share enhanced innovation, but only up 
to a point.  He noted, for example: “What counts is competition from the new 
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization 
… competition which … strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the 
existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.” Joseph Schumpeter, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82 (New York: Harper and Roe Publishers, 
1942). 
 
190 Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye? in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 361, 361–404, 406 (Josh Lerner & 
Scott Stern eds., National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 2012.) 
[www.nber.org/chapters/c12360]. 
 
191 See Shapiro, id., at 361–404.   
 
192 Pakes, A., and P. McGuire, Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical 







Recent empirical scholarship has shown that more competitive markets result in more 
innovation193 and that “market power tends to slow innovation and productivity 
improvements in the affected markets.”194  Carstensen and Lande note that “it is extremely 
difficult to determine a theory that offers an a priori prediction about the effects of 
competition on innovation that is robust to all of these different market and technological 
conditions or predict which innovation will be successful and which will prove a 
 
193  Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 8–12 (2012).  
194
 Id.  For a summary of the literature see Jonathan B. Baker, Market power in the U.S. 
economy today, WASHINGTON CENTER FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 57–58  (Mar. 20, 2017) 
available at http://equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis/market-power-in-the-u-s-
economy-today/ and accompanying notes.  Professor Baker explains this new learning: 
“The modern Schumpeterian growth literature concludes that greater product-market 
competition fosters R&D investment by all firms in sectors where the firms operate at the 
same technological level, and suggests that in the event that product markets were to 
grow more competitive, the innovation incentives of a dominant firm with a 
technological lead would remain high….” (citing Shapiro, supra n. 22, at 372–74 (Josh 
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2012.); Id. at note 57.  
 
         As Professor Baker notes: “At one time, empirical economists who studied the 
question thought that some market power but not extensive market power would be best 
for innovation, based on cross-industry studies that found an “inverted-U” relationship 
between market concentration. But those studies did not successfully control for 
differences in technological opportunity across industries.”  Id. To support his conclusion 
Prof. Baker provides the following: “ Wesley M. Cohen, Fifty Years of Empirical Studies 
of Innovative Activity and Performance, 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
INNOVATION 129, 146–48, 154–55 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010); 
Shapiro, supra note 21, at 380.  For an older survey finding no losses in innovation from 
mergers see DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 




failure.”195 Thus, it is vital to continue to have many innovative options being explored and 
developed at the same time.  
 
Recent literature shows some enforcement authorities, concerned with dynamic 
competition, have implicitly recognized the need to maintain a larger group of competitors 
in “innovation markets” because “innovation suffers when drug companies 
merge.”196  Similarly, John Kwoka in his review of the merger literature, concludes that: 
“[O]verall, the careful economic studies in the literature as well as other relevant evidence 
do not support the proposition that industry consolidation results in more R&D or greater 
R&D efficiency. In fact, there is evidence in these studies that suggests that these mergers 
adversely affect R&D.”197  Nearly all studies found that increases in competition led to 
increases in industry productivity.198 With greater competition, there is greater fear of 
innovation by competitors so investment in innovation is more likely. These cases illustrate 
another reason why monopoly is bad for investment and innovation; if a firm has no 
competitors, then its input suppliers have a greater incentive to invest in their own market 
power and thereby extract surplus from the monopoly.199  
 
195
 Peter Carstensen and Robert Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the 
Importance of Redundant Competitors, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 783 (2018).  Some argue that 
the difficulty of making predictions about innovation in individual cases means that these 
dynamic issues should not be the basis for merger enforcement decisions. See, e.g., 
Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger 
Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19 (1995). 
 
196 See Justus Haucap &  Joel Stiebale, Research: Innovation Suffers When Drug 
Companies Merge, HARV. BUS. R. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/research-
innovation-suffers-when-drug-companies-merge.  
 
197 See John Kwoka, The Effects of Mergers on Innovation: Economic Framework and 
Empirical Evidence at 30 (draft on file with the authors).  
 
198 For example,  Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, A Model of Discovery, AM. 
ECON. REv., 99 (2): 337-42; J De Loecker, PK Goldberg, Firm performance in a global 
market, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 2014, 201–07. Performance in a Global Market, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080114741 
199 James A. Schmitz Jr. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 
286 Revised February 2005,  James A Schmitz Jr., What Determines Productivity? 
Lessons from the Dramatic Recovery of the U.S. and Canadian Iron Ore Industries 
Following Their Early 1980s Crisis, 113(3) J. POL. ECONOMY 582–624 (2005). See also 
the Thomas J. Holmes and Andrew S. Schmitz,  Competition at Work: Railroads as 
Monopoly in U.S. Shipping, Federal Reserve Bank, MINNEAPOLIS QUARTERLY REV., 
25(2) 3-39 (2001).  The effect of competition also is shown by the review of Holmes and 
Schmitz (2010), which examines the literature of industries experiencing dramatic 





2. Effects On International Competitiveness 
 
Michael Porter finds that the prevalence of domestic rivals tends to lead to an 
international advantage and has a direct role in stimulating improvement and 
innovation.200  He further notes that firms that do not innovate will not succeed.201   
 
Porter finds that “few roles of government are more important to the 
upgrading of an economy than ensuring vigorous domestic rivalry,” whereas 
"creating a dominant [domestic] competitor rarely results in international 
competitive advantage.”202  Porter, analyzing a number of countries over time, further 
notes that firms that do not have to compete at home rarely succeed abroad”, and that 
“economies of scale are best gained through selling abroad, not through dominating 
the home market.”203  Practical politics, according to Porter, make a market of one or 
two firms a “policy nightmare” as “there is a strong tendency for special deals and 
favored treatment by government that dull incentives.”204   
 
Porter’s work is not alone in finding that domestic competition is central to 
economic growth.205  By contrast, in Latin America, where economic growth has been 
slow, markets are often characterized by highly concentrated industrial sectors, lack 
of a strong competition policy, large informal economies, and historically close links 
between business and the political community.206 Stronger competition policy can be 
 
Competition and Productivity: A Review of the Evidence, 2 ANNUAL REV. OF ECON. 619. 
See cites to other studies in Holmes and Schmitz articles.  
 
200 MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 143 (The Free Press, 
1990). 
 
201 Id. at 30.  
 
202  Id. at 662   
 
203 Id. at 662. 
 
204 Id. This echoes Schumpeter’s statements about the effect of monopoly on political 
structure.  
 
205 See e.g., F. D. Leigh Díez,, and S. Tambunlertchai, Global Market Power and its 
Macroeconomic Implications, (IMF, Working Paper No. 18/137, 2018).  
 
206 Gabriela Lecaro Calle, OECD-IDB Latin American Competition Forum 2012, 
Cooperación Económica y Técnica V Reunión Anual del Grupo de Trabajo en Manta, 
Ecuador 2 y 3 de diciembre de 2015 in COMERCIO Y COMPETENCIA DE AMÉRICA LATINA 
Y EL CARIBE (GTCC) (2016). 
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part of changes in competition that might help promote economic growth and 
competition.207   
 
Spurred by increasing globalization, there is increasing interest in 
international cooperation with respect to antitrust.208 Globally, antitrust law is part 
of a striking mixture of promoting competitiveness on the one hand, and protection 
of favored industries and cartel exemptions on the other.209 There are clear attempts 
of nations to slant antitrust in ways that favor the home country at the expense of 
others.210 As each country does this, it would seem to result in harm to each country’s 
trade and to lower welfare.  A global no fault approach could help address this 







3.  Effects on Allocative Inefficiency & Wealth Transfers 
 
In 1954 Harberger estimated that the costs of monopoly that resulted from 
misallocation of resources across industries were trivial.211  Harberger’s focus was on 
the deadweight loss (DWL) from monopoly pricing212 (but not on its transfer effects). 
This research led to the near consensus in the economics profession that monopoly 







209 For example, American law provide an explicit exception for export cartels. See 
generally Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L. 
L. 355 (2004).  
 
210 Id.  
 
211 Arnold C. Harberger, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 2, 77–87 (May 1954) (May, 1954). 
 
212 For a definition of the deadweight loses from monopoly pricing see Richard Zerbe & 
Dwight Dively, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Harper and Row, 
1994). 
 
213 For other attempts to measure the costs of market power, see Keith Cowling and 
Dennis C. Mueller, The Social Cost of Monopoly Power, 88 ECON. J. 727–48 (Dec. 
1978);  Joaquin Maudos and Juan Fernandex de Guevara find that for 15 EU countries 
56 
 
empirical estimates of the relative sizes of the deadweight loss to get somewhat 
higher values of DWL (0.5 to 2.0% of GNP).214 
 
In sharp contrast to Harberger’s finding, more recent studies show that the 
allocative inefficiency (deadweight welfare losses) costs associated with monopoly 
are large, even quite large.215 Further, insofar as government regulation or policy can 
be used to create or preserve monopoly, there will be competition to gain government 
support for this.216  These costs are income or wealth transfers217 without 
accompanying productive gains: rent-seeking.218  Gordon Tulloch introduced this 
idea in 1967 and Anne Kreuger expanded and labeled it in 1974.219 In 1975, Richard 
 
over 1993–2002, “the welfare gains associated with a reduction of market power are 
greater than the loss of bank cost efficiency, showing the importance of economic policy 
measures aimed at removing the barriers to outside competition.” The cost of market 
power in banking: Social welfare loss vs. cost inefficiency, 31 J. Banking & Finance 
2103–25 (July 2007), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.10.028.  Generally see J. De 
Loecker, and J. Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic 
Implications (NBER, Working Paper No. 23687, 2017). 
 
For a criticism of market power studies and measurements, see Stephen C. Littlechild, 
Misleading Calculations of the Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 91 ECON. J. 348-63 
(June 1983). 
 
214 See F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 667–78 (3rd ed. 1990) 
 
215, See, e.g., James Schmitz, New and Larger Costs of Monopoly and Tariffs, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS RESEARCH DEPARTMENT STAFF REPORT 468 (July 2012).  
 
216 Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. 
REV., 291–303 (1974). 
 
217 As an example of the transfer effects of monopoly power, work by Brett Gordon 
and Ron Goettler examined whether or not the presence of AMD caused Intel to 
innovate their central processing units (CPUs) more or less than they would have 
absent the competition. They find that Intel would have innovated more as a 
monopoly with an important caveat: even though Intel might have been more 
innovative, most consumers were better off with slightly less innovation and the 
stronger price competition that AMD brought to the marketplace.  See Ronald L. 
Goettler and Brett R. Gordon, Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate More?, 119 J. POLIT. 
ECON. 6, 1141–1200 (Dec. 2011) [http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/664615]. 
218 See Krueger, supra note 216, at 291–303.   
 




Posner argued that competition to engage in rent seeking could raise costs until all 
monopoly profits were transformed into costs.220   
 
Further development has both attempted to quantify these costs and shown 
that rent- seeking occurs both within a monopoly firm and outside it.221 These 
estimates come from examining histories of industries in which a monopoly is 
destroyed or created. Rent-seeking behavior by different divisions within the firm 
and between the firm and its unions is quite costly, resulting in: (1) lower productivity 
at each factory, and (2) misallocation of resources between high and low productively 
plants.222  As Schmitz notes, “[w]hen a monopoly is created, “rents” are created”.223 
Conflict emerges among shareholders, managers, and employees of the monopoly as 
they negotiate how to divide these rents. Mechanisms are set up to split the rents. 
These mechanisms are often means to reduce competition among members of the 
monopoly. Although the mechanisms divide rents, they also destroy them (by leading 
to low productivity and misallocation)224. The costs due to just (1) above, that is, low 
productivity are large.  As monopoly was destroyed in each of these industries, 
productivity at each factory soared. Doubling of productivities in a few years was 
common. The value of the wasted inputs was as much as 20 percent to 30 percent of 
industry value added.225 
 
 
4. Effects on Income Equity & Equality226  
 
220 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POLIT. 
ECON. 807, 816 (1975).   
 





224 See id. 
 
225 Id.  
 
226 We also note a cultural argument for breaking up large firms, an argument that 
stems from existence values. Existence values occur when there is a willingness to 
pay for existence of a good, apart from its market value, which can arise when the 
market does not exist. Consider that large firms drive out small firms when in fact 
people would rather have smaller firms, but because of collective action costs, larger 
firms win. Suppose for example, that people favor small local stores as part of their 
culture. They tend, however, to buy from large price cutters as their prices are 
lower. The result is the loss of local stores which they did not want and if acting 
collectively would pay to avoid. Each person, however, buying from the large stores 
fails to account for the effects of their action on the structure of businesses as a whole. 




Thomas Piketty in Capital in the Twenty-First Century notes that between 
1980 and the present there has been an unprecedented increase in income inequality 
in the United States and Europe and that it is likely to become much more unequal 
unless new remedies are applied.227.  
 
Higher levels of inequality are associated with social instability and lower 
growth rates.  Piketty sees inequality challenging democracy and leading to 
oligarchy, if left unabated.228 He predicts dire consequences in the absence of 
remedies.229 Similarity, Jonathan Baker and Steve Salop maintain that inequality may 
undermine the legitimacy of our social order, given the wealthiest have a 
disproportionate influence on public policy and reduce economic growth.230  
 
Part of the cause for rising inequality lies in competition policy. An OECD 
paper231 covering eight OECD countries––Canada, France, Germany, Korea, Japan, 
Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States––that for the “average country in 
the sample, market power increased the wealth of the richest 10% and by between 
12% and 21% for a range of reasonable assumptions about savings behavior, while 
it reduces the income of the poorest 20% by 11% or more.” The paper suggests that 
 
Reconsidered. In: The American Economic Review, Volume 57, Issue 4, Sep. 1967, pp. 
777-786 
 
227 Thomas Piketty, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Harvard University Press, 
2013). Zerbe (2016) has estimated that the while the 2015 current top 1% has about 7 
times the per capital wealth of the bottom 50%, by 2065 this will grow to a factor of 185 
if the present trend continues. Richard O. Zerbe, THE PATH OF HUMAN PROGRESS, Ch. 9 
(2016). 
 
228 Piketty, Id. 
 
229 See id.   
 
230 Jonathan Baker and Steve Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 
GEO. L.J. 1, 5–8 (2015).  
 
231 Sean Enis et al., Inequality: A Hidden Cost of Market Power, OECD 21, 39. (2017) 




lack of competition is an important one source of economic inequality.232 Greater 
equality may then be a by-product of a strong competition policy.233  
 
C. Overview of Economic Arguments Against No-Fault 
 
1. Incentives To Not Compete As Vigorously 
 The effects of incentives on business behavior are complex and sometimes 
counter-intuitive, so prediction in the case of no-fault is difficult.234  One would think, 
however, that the possibility of an antitrust action against a firm achieving monopoly 
without engaging in anticompetitive behavior would have some deterrent effect on 
monopoly formation.235 This deterrent effect could send a confusing or perverse signal to 
firms engaging in hard but fair competition, especially when a firm’s market share nears 
the minimum required for a Section 2 violation.236  George Bittlingmayer, for example, 
 
232 Id. Monopolies also give rise to political and welfare effects.  Schumpeter noted 
that even if the giant concerns were all managed perfectly, the political consequences 
of concentration would still exist because the political structure of a nation is 
profoundly affected by the elimination of a host of small and medium size firms. See 
also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Harvard University 
Press, 3rd edition, 1950). 
 
233 See id. 
 
234 For example, research finds that state tax decreases have little effect on business 
location or behavior. Soledad Artiz Prillaman and Kenneth J. Meier, Taxes, Incentives, 
and Economic Growth: Assessing the Impact of Pro-business Taxes on U.S. State 
Economies, 76 J. POLIT. 364–379  (2014). Galliana (2017) finds that monetary 
incentives for workers have a less persistent effect than implicit incentives such as 
in-house competition, and that monetary incentives can crowd out desirable 
behavior which would otherwise be found. Susana Gallani, Incentives, Peer Pressure, 
and Behavior Persistence (Harvard Business School, Working Paper No. 17-070, 
2017).  
 
235 Justice Hand noted in Alcoa that: "The successful competitor, having been urged to 
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."  United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 
430 (2d Cir. 1945). Justice Scalia went even further in Trinko: "The mere possession of 
monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices . . . is an important 
element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least 
for a short period—is what attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk 
taking that produces innovation and economic growth."  See Verizon Communications 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 
236  For the minimum market share levels usually required for a Section 2 violation, see 




believes that “whatever the ability of antitrust to lower prices and increase output in 
theory or in isolated circumstances, one actual effect of antitrust in practice may have 
been to curtail investment.”237 Similarly, when a monopolist is shielded from hard 
competition it may be able to relax and enjoy a quiet life.238 Jonathan Baker239, for 
example, suspects there is a positive welfare effect of antitrust deterrence that is large. 
Baker examines socially beneficial antitrust challenges by the federal antitrust agencies to 
price-fixing and other forms of collusion, to mergers that appear likely to harm 
competition; and to monopolists that use anticompetitive exclusionary practices to obtain 
or maintain their market power.240 He then reviews systematic empirical evidence on the 
value of antitrust derived from informal experiments involving the behavior of US firms 
during periods without effective antitrust enforcement, and the behavior of firms across 
 
237 George Bittlingmayer, Investment and Antitrust Enforcement, 3 CATO J. 295-325, 344 
(2001). 
 
238 Sir John Hicks observed in 1935 that monopolists "are likely to exploit their 
advantage much more by not bothering to get very near the position of maximum 
profit, than by straining themselves to get very close to it. The best of all monopoly 
profits is a quiet life."  See J.R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory 
of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRA I 8 (1935).  
 
Economists have written about inefficiencies that result when a monopolist is 
shielded from hard competition. See Liebenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-
Efficiency," 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966). Professor Liebenstein argues that the 
motivations and incentives of workers and managers are different when their firm 
does not have to face competition: "In situations where competitive pressure is 
light, many people will trade the disutility of greater effort, of search, and the 
control of other peoples' activities for the utility of feeling less pressure and of 
better interpersonal relations. But in situations where competitive pressures are 
high, and hence the costs of such trades are also high, they will exchange less of the 
disutility of effort for the utility of freedom from pressure, etc." Id. at 413.   
 
Similarly, monopolies can create "organizational slack" by tolerating inefficiency 
and waste. Without the discipline of competition, monopolies may have less 
incentive to cut waste and to search for ways to reduce costs. They may have the 
discretion to make only a comfortable profit and to tolerate a substantial amount of 
"fat" in their organizations and thus further waste society's resources. Some 
economists believe that it is "eminently plausible" that inefficiencies resulting from 
weak competitive pressures "are at least as large as the welfare losses from 
[allocative inefficiency]." See F. M. Scherer and David Ross, supra note 48, at 466.  
 
239 Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
27–50. (2003).  
 




different national antitrust regimes.241 Overall he finds benefits of antitrust enforcement 
to consumers and social welfare appear to be far larger than what the government spends 
on antitrust enforcement and firms spend directly or indirectly on antitrust compliance.242 
 
Of course, reduced incentives to compete vigorously are far from no 
incentives. Even if a monopolist or would-be monopolist’s incentives to compete are 
reduced, no fault could also increase incentives for rivals and potential rivals to 
compete harder.243 Similarly, it could serve to reduce the presence of monopoly less 
expensively than conventional antitrust actions. This would be similar to a firm 
refraining from establishing a monopoly in the expectation that the rents would all 
go to elsewhere, e.g. to a union.      
 
2. Incentives to Engage In Sham litigation 
Sham litigation244 is non-legitimate litigation whose purpose is to raise rivals 
costs relative to those of the firm filing the lawsuit.245  It is a type of non-price 
predatory behavior.246 A study by Christopher Klein suggested economic criteria for 
determining whether such litigation is sham or legitimate.247  He examined 117 
Sherman Act countersuits alleging sham litigation.248  He found that while fewer 
countersuits were litigated than had been expected according to his criteria, more of 
 
 241 See id. 
 
242 See id. 
 
243 See id. 
 
244 Areeda notes, however, that protections against sham litigation run the risk of chilling 
access to First Amendment rights of free speech. Phillip Areeda and E. Little-Brown, 
1982 SUPPLEMENT TO ANTITRUST LAW. 
 
245 See, e.g., William Baumol and Janusz Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert 
Competition, 28 J. L. & ECON. 247–65 (May 1985). R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon, 
and Sue H. Mialon, Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?, 
DOJ (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/private-antitrust-litigation-
procompetitive-or-anticompetitive.  
246 See Steven Salop and David Scheffman, Raising Rivals Costs, AM. ECON. REV. (May 
1983). 
 
247 Christopher Klein, The Economics of Sham Litigation: Theory Cases and Policy, 
BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (April 
1989) and also Klein, Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incentives in the Context of 
the Case Law,  INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. (December 1986). 
 




the countersuits were allowed to pass summary judgment than his criteria 
predicted.249 Applying his economic criteria would have then found fewer 
countersuits as legitimate than was the actual case.250 The implication for no fault is 
that the application and development of economic criteria to apply in rejecting no-




3. Increased Transaction Costs 
 
 Another argument against no fault is the transaction costs that would 
necessarily be involved in the resulting cases. The cases’ relief could entail significant 
transaction costs, regardless whether it is structural or conduct oriented.251 
Moreover, virtually every Antitrust case is expensive for both sides.252  No-fault would 
surely increase the number of Section 2 cases filed.  Yet, each case would be simpler 
because there would be no need to litigate whether the case involved anticompetitive 
conduct. Moreover, a major component of how many cases are brought, settled or 
move to trial, is the clarity of the law.253 Thus, a major determinant of the transaction 
costs involved would be the care with which a violation of the Sherman Act under no-
fault would be crafted.  The brighter the line, the fewer the cases that would be 
brought or go to trial.           
 
 
D. Special Problems involving Natural Monopolies and Patents 
 
 
249 See id. 
 
250 See id. 
 
251 For an excellent analysis of many of the possible transaction costs that could arise, 
especially in digital technology markets, see Diana L. Moss, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: 
The Implications of Restructuring and Regulating Digital Technology Markets, 




252 For examples of the high costs of antitrust litigation see Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. 
Lande, Toward An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust 
Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1305–10 (2013). 
 
253  See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger 




Non-structural relief is the traditional kind of relief ordered in monopolization 
cases, even in cases not involving natural monopolies or patents.254 This is because 
the Supreme Court observed that structural remedies are “more drastic” than 
injunctive relief.255  For example, in United States v. Microsoft Corp, the court said 
that "structural relief, which is 'designed to eliminate the monopoly altogether . . . 
require[s] a clearer indication of a significant causal connection between the conduct 
and creation or maintenance of the market power.'"256  In other words, the standards 
for a court ordering a structural remedy are higher than they are for conduct oriented 
remedies.257  
 
 Indeed, in the monopolization case against it, Microsoft asserted, “[l]eaving 
aside negotiated consent decrees, no court has ever split apart a unitary company 
not formed by mergers. The fact that no court has ever ordered the breakup of a 
unitary company like Microsoft demonstrates the extreme nature of the district 
court’s decree."258 Even if Microsoft’s absolutist assertion is, as Professor Kovacic 
demonstrates, a significant exaggeration,259 there is no doubt that divestiture is an 
 
254  United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961).   
 
255  Id.  Areeda & Turner note that an injunction "is the least disruptive" remedy a court 
can give and the court's goal is to restore competitive conditions, not to punish. 4A Philip 
E. Areeda, et al., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION § 990c, at 126 (4th ed. 2014);  2A Philip E. Areeda, et al., ANTITRUST LAW: 
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 325c, at 17 (4th ed. 
2014).  
 
256  253 F.3d 34, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (quoting Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, supra note 12, ¶ 653b, at 9192) As one federal district judge noted after 
finding that the defendant, the American Can Company, had violated the Sherman Act: “I 
am frankly reluctant to destroy so finely adjusted an industrial machine as the record 
shows the defendant to be.” United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 2d 859, 908 (D. 
Md. 1916).   
 
257 At a Sherman Act Joint Hearing, MIT professor Franklin Fisher noted that "courts are 
traditionally reluctant to grant structural relief" and "crafting [a structural remedy] is not 
easy and may sometimes be impossible." Sherman Act Section 2 Joint Hearing: 
Remedies Hr'g Tr. 47, Mar. 28, 2007(?), at 110 (Fisher).  
 
 258 See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 128, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 
34 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 27, 2000).   
 
 259 For example, Professor Willinam E. Kovacic provides statistics for the success of 
relief efforts in government monopolization cases: “When classified by outcomes, 
these deconcentration suits fall into three categories. The first category consists of 
thirty-four cases in which the government secured substantial divestiture. This set 
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unusual remedy in a monopolization case. 
 
This would surely mean that if Section 2 of the Sherman Act is interpreted to 
be a no-fault statute, monopolies convicted under this approach would rarely, if ever, 
be broken up. No fault cases surely should not qualify as the highly exceptional cases 
in which a monopoly should be broken up. Rather, we would expect remedies in no 
fault cases to be similar to those under consideration in Europe, which is considering 
conduct proposals forbidding technology firms, such as Google, to benefit in certain 
circumstances from using information they collect as part of their normal business.260 
There are in fact a number of suggested remedies short of breakup such as data 
sharing, open platforms and other solutions.261   
 
1. Natural Monopoly 
 
Natural monopolies are those for which economies of scale or scope exceed 
sustainable market size.262 A major modern concern relating to natural monopoly is 
 
contains such landmark decisions as Standard Oil Co. v. United States and United 
States v. American Tobacco Co. A second category of prosecutions consists of cases 
such as United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, in which the government prevailed 
on liability but failed to gain significant divestiture. The final category includes cases 
such as United States v. United States Steel Corp. (U.S. Steel) in which the government 
failed to establish the defendant's liability under the Sherman Act. This section 
identifies and analyzes the historical patterns in which these deconcentration 
measures have emerged. It begins with a review of the historical trends and ends by 
attempting to explain their causes.” Willian E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The 
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 
74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1111–12 (1989). 
 
260 An expert report to the European Commission has said antitrust law could specify 
when data holders could be forced to grant access to their competitors. A report by 
Jacques Crémer Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy for 
the Digital ERA, EUROPEAN COMMISSION Directorate-General for Competition E-
mail:comp-publications@ec.europa.eu European Commission B-1049 Brussels, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf.  
 
 261 See Moss, supra note 251.  
262  Natural monopolies are those whose costs decline with volume so that 
competition tends to be unviable. These network effects can be due to economies of 
scale, but often arise when there are economies in the production of related products, 
called economies of scope.  In this sense, the no-fault rule can legitimately apply in 
the case of natural monopoly short of breakup, suggesting restraints on use of 
monopoly positions. The concept of natural monopoly was first given a theoretically 
satisfactory definition, based on the idea of subadditivity, by JOHN PANZER, ROBERT 
WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (Harcourt Brace 
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network externalities which include both scale and scope economies.263 A classic 
example of a natural monopoly is the type of networks that exist in 
telecommunications field.  The more people sign up, the cheaper it is for the provider 
per unit of service. What would happen if no-fault were applied to natural 
monopolies?  We address this only to note that there are several possible remedies 
short of break up for monopolies, both in general and especially for monopolies 
involving natural monopolies or patents. Natural monopolies strengthen their power 
by their ability to information collected as part of their monopoly and can themselves 
be reasonably tempered by requiring them to share data acquired from customers. 
Moreover, if plaintiff were so unwise as to seek the break-up of a natural monopoly 
under a no-fault theory, it seems likely that the reaction of the court would be to 




A no-fault Sherman Act implies that a monopoly legally gained through patents 
could face prosecution upon expiration of the crucial patent.  However, this would 
mean that the firm had already enjoyed 20 years in which to earn monopoly returns. 
The monopolist could, moreover, avoid private damages suits by lowering its price to 
some negotiated level or a level its potential prosecutors or judges are likely to deem 
competitive. Thus, there would be significant incentives for firms leaving patent 
monopoly status to quickly lower their prices.  Moreover, Michele Boldrin and David 
K. Levine find little evidence that patents spur innovation.265  If they are correct the 
current patent system may be misguided.266 If they are correct, no fault would not 
cause any patent related harms. 
 
 
E.  Micro-Studies of Two Huge Monopolization Cases: AT&T and IBM 
 
 
Javonovich, 1982). A cost function is “subadditive” when any given total output can 
be produced more cheaply by a single firm than by two or more firms. An industry in 
which the cost function is subadditive is therefore regarded as a natural monopoly.  
 
263 See id.   
 264 See the explanation for this type of likely reaction provided by William E. Kovacic, 
Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition Laws, in 2 CURRENT 
COMPETITION LAW 173–74, (Mads Andenas et al. eds., 2004)., discussed infra at ___. 
 
265 Michele Boldrin and David Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. 






 One approach to predicting the probable effects of no fault monopoly would 
be to systematically study the results of a large number of cases where a defendant 
had been subjected to a remedy in a Section 2 case. Although this would not address, 
let alone answer all the economic questions involved, it would further the analysis 
considerably.  We present two microanalyses of Section 2 remedies only to suggest 
what type of analysis could be performed on a much more detailed level and for a 
much larger number of cases. 
 
The Justice Department filed possibly the two largest Section 2 cases in history 
against IBM and AT&T.267  In 1982 the Justice Department announced that they were 
abandoning the IBM case and that AT&T had capitulated.268  AT&T lost their case.269  
IBM won theirs.270 Yet, eleven years later on January 28th, 1993, four days after IBM 
posted a quarterly loss of $5.46 billion, AT&T reported record quarterly earnings of 
$1 billion and a yearly profit of $3.8 billion on sales of $65 billion.271 Robert Morris, a 
telecommunications analyst at Goldman, Sachs, correctly predicted that AT&T will be 
"an awesome multimedia communications giant by the turn of the century."272 Robert 
Allen the chairman of AT&T noted, "We were forced by divestiture to make changes 
that probably were good for us. We went through some tough years, but it paid off. 
We may have been more fortunate than IBM in that change was forced on us."273 
 
Although the decision to break up AT&T was controversial at the time274, the 
facts “don’t lie.”275 Since the break-up, the telecommunications field has gone from 
 
267 See James B. Stewart, Whales and Sharks, NEW YORKER 37, Feb. 15, 1993. 
 






271 Id. at 38. 
 




274 See OECD, Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and Innovation 
161 (OECD Publishing, 2013). The report documents the importance of innovation 
achieved by knowledge bases technology (KBT) in the United States and Europe.  
 
275 TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 96–97 (noting 
of the breakup of AT&T: “Some economists point to lower prices in the wake of the 





high-cost long-distance phone calls and rotary dial phones to smart phones, wireless 
technology, and the development of the Internet.  As one account notes of the break-
up: “In the aftermath, AT&T reduced long distance rates by 40% over six years, 
though local carriers added access charges that prevented consumers from seeing all 
of the cost reduction. The local operating companies (led by Ameritech, beginning in 
the Chicago area that was home to Motorola, which helped develop the radio 
technology) also began offering mobile service in the 1980s after it had been 
developed by Bell Labs.” 276   As Professor Wu has noted, “It became apparent, in 
retrospect, just how much innovation the Bell system monopoly had been holding 
back.  For out of the carcass of AT&T emerged entirely new types of industries 
unimagined or unimaginable during the reign of AT&T.”277  Porter also concluded that 
telecommunications services became a hotbed of innovation after that breakup of 
AT&T.278  
 
Would it have been better for IBM to also have capitulated?  Probably!  John 
Shenefield, President Carter’s Assistant Attorney General in charge of antitrust from 1977 
to 1979, presided over both cases: 
 
[I]f IBM had gone through the divestiture it would have had to develop new 
entrepreneurial opportunities. With real competition, who knows what imagination 
and creativity that process might have invited.  Competition theorists think the 
industry as a whole would have been better off if IBM had been broken up, and it 
would have been better for the pubic.  I think it would have been better for the 
shareholders too.279 
 
F.  Conclusions: Summary of Probable Gains and Losses 
Any summary of probable gains and losses from no-fault or no-action is 
problematic.  It depends upon empirical data that – because no fault has never 
before been tried - simply does not exist. The best we can do is to present 
conclusions from roughly comparable areas and to make inferences from them that 
might hold true to some extent. This uncertainty is true both in general, and 
especially for the effects of no-fault on particular industries. Thus, the table below is 
meant as a guide for further discussion not to provide a definitive answer.  
             The following Table shows the costs and benefits of three possible policy 
options. 1. The "Present Status Base Case Costs" column gives the positives and 
 
276 JOHN M. JORDAN, INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND INNOVATION: RESOURCES FOR 
GROWTH IN A CONNECTED WORLD 173 (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012). 
 
277 Wu, supra note 275, at 96–97. 
 
278 See Porter, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 664 (Free Press, 1990).  
 
279 See Whales and Sharks, supra note 266, at 38. 
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negatives of the current Section 2 regime (which requires anticompetitive conduct for a 
violation); 2. The "Costs of No Action on Antitrust" column considers what would be 
likely to happen if no Section 2 cases were brought. 3. The "Costs of No Fault" column 
refers to the results if a "no fault" policy was implemented.  The terms "smaller" and 
"larger" refer to costs and benefits of no-fault or no action compared to the current 
situation (the “Base Case”).  
 
              For example, the first item is "Allocative Loss Due to DWL [deadweight 
loss].  "No action" would be likely to produce larger allocative losses, and "no-fault" 
would be likely to reduce allocative losses substantially.  Of course, as we have indicated, 
a summary such as contained in the table below is speculative.  Our goal has been to 
suggest that a no-fault policy could well be positive and that it is worth considering, not 

















































VII.   Specific Effects Of This Textualist Analysis On Antitrust Law 
 
A.  Effects On Monopolization Law 
  
 All of the 15 circa 1890 sources cited earlier defined “monopolize” as simply 
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the terms  “monopolize” and “monopoly” equated them.280 Today, of course, 
anticompetitive conduct is required for a violation, but a court sometimes will find 
the “monopoly power” required for the offense of “monopolization” when a firm has 
less than 100% of a market.281  This is because the current requirement for 
monopoly power is not that the firm have a 100% complete “monopoly”.  Rather it is 
that the firm has the power to “raise price or restrict output”.282  This ability can be 
found in some situations when a firm’s market share is as low as 70%, and possibly 
even lower.283   
 
280 See supra Section 4(A). 
 
281
 See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust 'Treble' Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 
OHIO STATE L. J. 115, 148-51 (1993). “These results imply an "average" monopolist 
market share of between seventy-five and eighty-five percent.” 
 
281  Moreover, “monopoly” might have been used colloquially the same way - to only 
apply to firms with 100% of a market.  For example, one of the most influential 
business journalists of the period, Ida Tarbell, seemed to use "monopoly" this way.  
 
In her extremely influential article "The History of the Standard Oil Company," Ida 
Tarbell most often refers to the Standard Oil Company and the South Improvement 
Company, a related Rockefeller company, as not quite being a “monopoly”. First, in 
referring to the Standard Oil Company’s beginnings, she states that after John 
Rockefeller secured a lower shipping rate for his company’s oil in 1870, he had 
achieved “almost a complete monopoly” just a few years later. Ida M. Tarbell, The 
History of the Standard Oil Company, MCCLURE’S MAGAZINE 3, Nov. 1902, 118. In 
1972, Rockefeller created the South Improvement Company with the goal of buying 
and controlling Cleveland oil refineries to the advantage of the Standard Oil 
Company. Id. The owner of one of these refineries, in explaining why he chose to sell 
his business to the South Improvement Company, said it was easier to sell "rather 
than fight such a monopoly." Id. at 127. As the South Improvement Company grew, 
the press and the public heard rumors of its advantageous deals with railroads. Id. at 
252. Tarbell describes the general opinion at the time as "if the railroads had made 
the contracts as charged . . . nothing but an absolute monopoly of the entire oil 
business by this combination could result." Id. Finally, Tarbell notes that the 
Standard Oil Company's competitors, like the Pennsylvania Railroad, raised a "cry of 
monopoly" and considered the company to be "aiming at an absolute monopoly." Id. 




 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
 




 Moreover, the vast majority of firms found to have engaged in illegal 
monopolization had market shares less than 100%.284  For this reason if a textualist 
approach to an alleged “monopolization” violation required a 100% market share, 
this would dramatically limit Section 2’s reach.   
 
 It certainly is possible, however, that a textualist interpretation of Section 2 
would not require a “monopolizing” firm to have 100% of a relevant market.  Scalia 
& Garner believe that the "notion that words should be strictly construed" is 
untrue.285  They quote Justice Frankfurter in Utah Junk Co. v. Porter: "Literalness 
may strangle meaning." 286 They conclude: "Strict constructionism understood as a 
judicial straightjacket is a long-outmoded approach deriving from a mistrust of all 
enacted law" and "Textualists should object to being called strict constructionists. 
Whether they know it or not, that is an irretrievably pejorative term, as it ought to 
be.  Strict constructionism, as opposed to fair-reading textualism, is not a doctrine to 
be taken seriously. (emphasis added)"  
 
 Could interpreting Section 2 as only prohibiting monopolies with a 100% 
market share be considered to be overly strictly construing the word "monopoly," 
and not a “fair reading” of the statute? After all, a firm with a 98% market share as a 
practical matter is as likely to be able to use monopoly power to harm consumers as 
a firm with 100% of a market.  Indeed, the 1895 E. C, Knight case referred to a firm 
with a 98% market share as a "monopoly".287  And the 1911 Standard Oil decision 
 
of monopoly power, at least with evidence of substantial barriers to entry and 
evidence that existing competitors could not expand output.”  ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments, 225 (4th ed. 1997) at 225-329.   “In 
contrast, courts virtually never find monopoly power when market share is less 
than about 50 percent. The greatest uncertainty exists when market shares are 
between 50 percent and 70 percent.” ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Annual 
Review of Antitrust Law Developments, 37 (7th ed. 2012) at 38–39. 
 
284
 See Lande, supra note 281. 
 
285  See Scalia & Supra note 26 at 155.  
 
286  Id., quoting Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946).   
 
287 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (“Revere produced annually 
about two percent of the total amount of sugar refined.” Id. at 4) (“By the purchase 
of the stock of the four Philadelphia refineries with shares of its own stock the 
American Sugar Refining Company acquired nearly complete control of the 
manufacture of refined sugar within the United States.  The fundamental question is 
whether, conceding that the existence of a monopoly in manufacture is established 
by the evidence, that monopoly can be directly suppressed under the act of Congress 
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stated that, at common law, "monopoly" and "restraint of trade" were 
synonymous. That is, something could be deemed a "monopoly" if it produced 
some of its "baneful effects" even if the defendant did not possess a complete  
monopoly.288 This would support the conclusion that a firm could be found to be a 
"monopoly" with less than a 100% market share.289   
 
 It seems reasonable that a firm with somewhat less than 100% of a market 
that otherwise exhibits all the characteristics of a firm with a 100% market share, a 
firm that produces the same harmful effects,290 should be included within Section 
 
in the mode attempted by this bill.  ... Again, all the authorities agree that, in order to 
vitiate a contract or combination, it is not essential that its result should be a 
complete monopoly; it is sufficient if it really tends to that end, and to deprive the 
public of the advantages which flow from free competition.). Id. at 16 
 
288 "And, by operation of the mental process which led to considering as a monopoly 
acts which, although they did not constitute a monopoly, were thought to produce 
some of its baneful effects, so also because of the impediment or burden to the due 
course of trade which they produced, such acts came to be referred to as in restraint 
of trade. This is shown by my Lord Coke's definition of monopoly as being "an 
institution or allowance . . . whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or 
corporate, are sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty that they had before 
or hindered in their lawful trade." 
It is illustrated also by the definition which Hawkins gives of monopoly wherein it is said 
that the effect of monopoly is to restrain the citizen "from the freedom of manufacturing 
or trading which he had before." And see especially the opinion of Parker, C.J., in Mitchel 
v. Reynolds (1711), 1 P. Williams, 181, where a classification is made of monopoly 
which brings it generically within the description of restraint of trade. 
Generalizing these considerations, the situation is this: 1. That, by the common law, 
monopolies were unlawful because of their restriction upon individual freedom of 
contract and their injury to the public…. And that, at common law, the evils consequent 
upon engrossing, etc., caused those things to be treated as coming within monopoly, and 
sometimes to be called monopoly, and the same considerations caused monopoly, 
because of its operation and effect, to be brought within and spoken of generally as 
impeding the due course of, or being in restraint of, trade."  See U.S. v. Standard Oil, 221 
U.S. 1, 31 (1911) (We are indebted to Prof. Meese for directing us to this and other 
relevant references).   
289 Of course this opinion was issued 21 years after the Sherman Act was passed, 
so it should carry less weight than a more contemporaneous opinion.  
   
290 "Textualism does not purport to exclude consideration of purpose or policy from 
statutory interpretation. To the contrary, because all statutory language is at least 
somewhat open-ended, textualists acknowledge that a 'certain degree of discretion' 
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2’s prohibitions. This is especially true because otherwise a potential defendant 
usually could render the monopolization offense a nullity by deliberately leaving 2% 
of a market to others.291  Justice Scalia believed that “Some outcome-pertinent 
consequences… are relevant to a sound textual decision – specifically, those that: (1) 
cause a private instrument or government prescription to be ineffective.292  
Moreover, to construe the “monopoly” requirement in a manner that neutralizes the 
statute would be an arguably absurd result.  As Justice Scalia293  and Justice 
Kavanaugh noted, the “absurdity doctrine”294 can, in truly extreme situations, 
prevent statutes from being interpreted irrationally. 
 
    There are two other situations that could arise if Section 2 were interpreted 
textually where the absurdity doctrine also perhaps could be invoked.  First, private 
plaintiffs could sue under a no-fault theory for treble damages and other relief.295  
Under a textualist interpretation this could indeed happen.  At least in theory.   
 
 There would, however, be nothing “absurd” about requiring even a 
monopolist that had not undertaken any anticompetitive conduct to nevertheless 
return the monopoly overcharges it took from customers, and remedy any other 
damages it caused.  Moreover, if Antitrust’s so-called “treble damages” remedy is 
analyzed empirically, with consideration given to its lack of prejudgment interest, 
lack of payments for allocative inefficiency effects or umbrella effects of monopoly 
pricing, and other factors, even a “treble damages” award is probably on average 
really only single damages.296 
 
 
is suitable in 'most' judicial decision making. When statutory ambiguity leaves room 
for the exercise of such discretion, textualists believe it is appropriate,  if not 
necessary, for an interpreter to consider a statute's apparent background purpose 
or policy implications in choosing among competing interpretations."  John F. 
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARVARD L. REV. 2388, 2408 (2003).  
 
291  However, a firm with only a 2% market share might not be viable. 
 
292  Scalia and Garner, supra note 26, at 352.   
 
293  Id. 
   
294  See Kavanaugh, supra note 130, at 2119. 
 
295 Structural remedies are relatively unusual in Section 2 cases and have 
traditionally been saved for the most egregious violations. See supra notes 257-59.  
Surely structural relief would be the rare exception in no fault cases.   
 
296 See Robert H. Lande, “Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages? 54 
OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1993).  
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 Would many courts order true treble damages – or even true single damages 
- in a no-fault case?  Or would they do what courts often do even in routine antitrust 
cases when they believe it would be unjust to order excessive damages.  Professor 
Willian Kovacic pointed out that in many circumstances "a court might fear that the 
US statutory requirement that successful private plaintiffs receive treble damages 
runs a risk of over-deterrence. A court might seek to correct such perceived 
infirmities in the anti-trust system by recourse to means directly within its 
control—namely by modifying doctrine governing liability standards or by devising 
special doctrinal tests to evaluate the worthiness of private claims."297  For these 
reasons, as a practical matter damages awarded in a no-fault monopolization case 
rarely would be awarded, and those damages that were awarded would be defined 
stingily.298  
 
 Another arguably “absurd” outcome could result if prosecutors tried to 
impose criminal penalties in a no-fault case. This result would be as “absurd” as two 
other types of cases that could occur today under the Sherman Act as it is currently 
interpreted. 
 
 First, suppose two tiny competing businesses (such as bicycle stores), each 
on the opposite end of a large metropolitan area, fix prices. Assume that interstate 
commerce is impacted and their agreement did not result in a new product or 
significant efficiencies. If the government charged them with a criminal Section 1 
violation, they would not be able to argue as a defense that no prices actually 
increased, that entry was easy, etc.299  They would be guilty of a felony.300 
Apparently no criminal prosecution of this nature ever has taken place.  But if it did, 
would a court conclude that Section 1 of the Sherman Act did not cover price fixing, 
or would it instead act as Professor Kovacic indicated courts sometime act, and find 
some way to exonerate defendants, or at least to subject them to no more than a 
nominal penalty? 
 
297  See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public 
Competition Laws, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAW 167, 173–74 (Mads Andenas et al. 
eds., 2004). This and other sources making similar points was quoted in Robert H. Lande, 
Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 663,  
https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=usflawreview 
298 If a no-fault case reached the damages stage, the measurement issues might be 
simpler than in other Section 2 cases. In a fault-based Section 2 case courts have to 
determine the overall monopoly profits, but award only those monopoly profits attributed 
to the anticompetitive conduct. This parsing is extremely difficult.  Under no-fault the 
court would just have to determine the total monopoly overcharges. 
299 See Antitrust Law Developments, supra note 283.  
    
300 Id.  




 Second, in 1980 the Department of Justice, followed by 15 State Attorney 
Generals, prosecuted resale price maintenance (RPM) criminally, in United States v. 
Cuisinarts, Inc., and succeeded in obtaining a nolo contendere plea and a $250,000 
fine.301  At the time RPM was per se illegal, but today it is judged under the rule of 
reason,302 and many respected scholars believe it should be taken off the list of 
antitrust offenses entirely.303  When this prosecution was commenced many or most 
members of the antitrust community believed RPM was almost always 
anticompetitive.  The tide of scholarly opinion has changed considerably since 1980.  
But in theory RPM could again be prosecuted criminally.  And surely the court 
handling the case would do as Professor Kovacic suggests and find a way to 
exonerate defendant. 
 
 What would happen if the Department of Justice tried to prosecute a 
monopolist criminally under a no-fault theory?304  The court would find a way to 
 
301  See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc. 516 F. Supp 1008, 1011-11 (D. 
Conn) (discussing the criminal case, which resulted in a nolo contendere plea and a 
$250,000 fine), aff’d, 665 F. 2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981).  “The indictment was returned by a 
grand jury….” Id. at 1009. 
    
302 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
    
303 See id. 
    
304 One might ask: “Does the language of Section 2 suggest that Congress meant for 
DOJ to prosecute, and for juries to convict, executives of all companies that achieved 
monopoly positions?  If Congress did not intend for there to be an "efficiency" 
defense, doesn't it follow that criminal prosecutions of individual executives in 
charge of monopolists (however the monopoly was attained) would be fair game for 
criminal sanctions?  Was the judicial interpretation of the statute to require "bad 
acts" inevitable in light of the criminal nature of the Sherman Act? It seems to me 
that a textualist interpretation of the 1890 legislation would mean that criminal 
remedies would be available to prosecute firms and individuals who achieved their 
preeminence without "fault."  Imagine an extension to the floor debates in 1890: 
Question for Senator Edmunds: "Suppose I make the best buggy whip you ever 
saw.  Nobody else comes close. I am a monopolist.  Have I violated Section 2 of the 
draft statute, and can I be sent to jail for the offense?"  What would Edmonds have 
said in reply? Suppose DOJ had tried to prosecute individuals criminally for no-fault 
offenses.  Would that have destroyed the statute by creating massive political 
backlash?” 
 
A textualist might reply, “You're in effect making an argument that textualism is a 
poor way to interpret statutes.  But several justices believe in textualism. So even if 
your hypothetical dialogue had occurred, it is irrelevant. A textualist does not try to 
determine what Congress would have done in hypothetical circumstances other 
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rule in favor of defendant.  The court could, for example, define the market(s) 
involved in a way that meant defendant was not a monopolist.305  This hypothetical 
– and the two Section 1 hypos – show that even the possibility of criminal sanctions 
is an undesirable feature of Section 2.  But as Justice Scalia noted concerning the 
interpretation of statutes, ”When once the meaning is plain, it is not the province of 
a court to scan its wisdom or its policy.”306 
 
 In summary, a textualist interpretation of Section 2 would not find a 
requirement that defendant attained its monopoly by anticompetitive conduct.  
Whether a textualist court would absolve a firm with slightly less than a 100% 
market share is questionable. It is less likely, however, that a textualist would 
convict a firm of monopolization with a market share as low the lower bound 




B.  Effects on “Attempt To Monopolize” Law 
 
 Even if a textualist interpretation would in some ways increase but in other 
ways diminish the effectiveness of the “monopolization” portion of Section 2, its 
effects on the “attempt to monopolize” violation would do more than restore Section 
2’s vigor. Defendant would only be required to “attempt” to gain a monopoly, a 
requirement that should be construed as requiring only the intent to take over a 
market, and one concrete, significant act in furtherance of this intent. The act could 
be required to be “sufficient both in magnitude and in proximity to the fact intended, 
to be taken cognizance of by the law that does not concern itself with things trivial 
and small.”307   
 
 
than by simply looking at the “fair meaning" of the words of the statute, dictionaries 
of the period, etc. A textualist would in this way define "monopolize" and, since the 
statute does not contain an efficiency exception, not imply one. As Justice Scalia 
noted, it is a “false notion that when a situation is not quite covered by a statute, the 
court should reconstruct what the legislature would have done has it confronted the 
issue.” Scalia and Garner, supra note 26, at 349. 
    
305  One might even ask: “Suppose DOJ even tried to prosecute individuals criminally for 
no-fault offenses.  Would this destroy the statute by creating massive political backlash?”  
This certainly is a possibility.  At a minimum it would ruin the reputation of the enforcer 
who attempted it. But it is not relevant to the textualist interpretation of Section 2. 
 
306 See Scalia & Garner, supra note 26, at 353 
    
307 See the sources cited supra Section  IV ( C ), and especially the Bishop quotation in 
note 121 supra. 
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 This is very different from the current way the courts interpret the 
requirement that defendant have a “dangerous probability”308 of acquiring 
monopoly power.  Today the “dangerous probability” threshold often can be met by 
a firm with a lower market share that that required for “monopolization,” 
sometimes by a defendant with as little as 50% of a market.  But rarely by a firm 
with only a 30% market share.309  A textualist analysis, using the common law 
requirements for an “attempt”,310 means that the “attempt to monopolize” 
requirements should be satisfied for a defendant even with a relatively low market 
share level, such as 30% (assuming the existence of barriers to entry, etc.).  
  
 The attempted monopolization doctrine would, however, only apply to firms 
attempting to take over an entire market (or, since a textualist might not construe 
the word “monopoly” strictly, perhaps a firm attempting to take over virtually all of 
a market).  Suppose, for example, a firm with 50% of a relevant market, conceived of 
and attempted to implement a plan that would, if successful, give it 70% of that 
market.  This is far short of a 100% market share, and this defendant should not be 
convicted of attempted monopolization.311  Although firms’ plans to expand market 
 
308 “[B]ecause the attempt offense requires only that the defendant have a 
dangerous probability of acquiring monopoly power, whereas the monopolization 
offense requires that the defendant already possess that power, a lesser showing is 
required in an attempt case.”  ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Annual 
Review of Antitrust Law Developments, 37 (7th ed. 2012) at 51.  
   
309  As Antitrust Law Developments noted: “Although there are no precise market 
share boundaries, and while the other factors discussed below [defendant's ability 
to lessen or destroy competition in that market, intent, etc.] affect the 
analysis, courts often find a dangerous probability of success [of monopolization] 
where the defendant starts with a market share greater than 50 percent. In 
contrast, courts rarely find market shares between 30 percent and 50 percent 
sufficient. Courts virtually never find shares of less than 30 percent sufficient.    ABA 
Section of Antitrust Law, Annual Review of Antitrust Law Developments, 37 (7th ed. 
2012) at 51; ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments, 225 (4th ed. 
1997) at 225–329.  
 
310 See text accompanying note 122 supra, and notes 120-25 supra. In Swift & Co. v. 
United States, 196 U.S. 376, 402 (1905) Justice Holmes noted the common law origin of 
the attempt to monopolize offense: “The distinction between mere preparation and 
attempt is well known in the criminal law.” His “dangerous probability of success 
formulation is of only limited help in ascertain which conduct should suffice.  Id at 
396.   For an interesting attempt to monopolize with a very low market share see Brooke 
Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (defendant had only 




share significantly but remain far short of a 100% share may be common,312 courts 
should of course be skeptical of manufactured self-serving evidence that defendant 
was not actually trying to achieve complete control of a market.  
  
 In sum, a textualist approach to the “attempt to monopolize” portion of 
Section 2  would require that defendant had intended to take over an entire market, 
or perhaps almost all of it (i.e., 85% or even 98% of it).  It would not require that 
defendant had undertaken anticompetitive conduct. It should only require that 
defendant had the intent to acquire a monopoly and that it had taken a serious, 
significant and concrete step in this direction, an act that was sufficient in terms of 
magnitude and proximity. A defendant market share as low as 30% should, 
assuming barriers to entry, etc., sometimes suffice.     
 
 
C. No-Fault Monopolization As A Violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act 
 
 When Congress enacted the FTC Act it intended this law to be more 
expansive  than the Sherman Act.313  Despite the existence of the Sherman Act, 
Congress decided that additional, more encompassing, legislation was needed.  
Section 5 of the FTC Act was intended to prohibit not only every violation of the 
Sherman Act, but also (i) incipient violations of this law, (ii) conduct violating the 
spirit of the Sherman Act, and (iii) conduct violating recognized standards of 
business behavior.314 The Supreme Court has explicitly adopted this interpretation 
of the FTC Act,315 although the relevant precedent is more than a generation old.316   
 
311 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Annual Review of Antitrust Law Developments, 37 
(7th ed. 2012) at 51.; ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments, 225 
(4th ed. 1997) at 225–329. 
 
312 For example, in the FTC case against duPont involving the titanium dioxide 
market defendant has approximately a 40% market share and engaged in 
conduct likely to give it approximately 60% of the relevant market. It never 




313 See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of ‘Unfair Methods of Competition’ in Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, passim (1980).  
    
314  Id. at 299–300 
    
315 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-240 (1972).  
    
316 The Supreme Court’s most recent expansive interpretation of Section 5 was in FTC v. 




 Section 5 is a civil statute – its violation cannot result in criminal penalties.317 
Section 5 actions cannot be brought by private parties, and do not constitute 
Sherman Act precedent unless the court specifically finds that the practices at issue 
also violate the Sherman Act.318   
 
 Section 5 could be used as a way to implement no-fault if the Court is willing 
to undertake a textualist analysis of Section 2, but is reluctant to overturn Trinko 
and other Section 2 precedent.  Another reason for the use of Section 5 to sanction 
monopolies would occur if the Court is willing to re-think Section 2 using a textualist 
approach, but decides to do so in a non-expansive manner because it does not want 
no-fault cases to be  brought by private parties, or for there to be even a tiny fear 
that no-fault could lead to criminal penalties. 
 
 For these reasons the Court might not want to find that a firm had violated 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act under a no-fault theory.  Instead the Court might hold 
that defendant had committed an incipient violation of Section 2, or a violation of 
the spirit of Section 2, and thus that the firm had violated Section 5 of the FTC Act 
using a no-fault approach. For these reasons the Court might well find that Section 5, 
but not Section 2, sanctions all monopolies and attempts to monopolize.   
 
   
 
VIII. Conclusions: An Increasingly Textualist Supreme Court Should Implement No-
Fault 
 
  A no-fault interpretation of the Sherman Act is consistent with the tradition 
of Justice Brandeis, who believed: 
 
   [N]o monopoly in private industry in America has yet been attained 
by    efficiency alone….. It will be found that wherever competition 
has been    suppressed it has been due either to resort to ruthless 
processes, or by    improper use of inordinate wealth and power. 
The attempt to dismember    existing illegal trusts is not, therefore, an 
attempt to interfere in any way    with the natural law of business. It 
is an endeavor to restore health by    removing a cancer from the 
body industrial.319   
 
as including traditional antitrust violations and also “practices that the Commission 
determines are against public policy for other reasons.”     
 
317  See Averitt, supra note 313.    
 






 We hope and expect that the enforcers would never bring any type of 
antitrust case they believed was not in the public interest simply because defendant 
had violated the law. This should apply a fortiorari to no-fault cases. We also hope 
the enforcers would emphasize that even though anticompetitive conduct was not a 
requirement of a violation, the remedy sought would benefit consumers and in 
other respects be in the public interest.  
 
 There is an old saying that “the Supreme Court follows the election returns.”320  
Regardless how true this is, is there even a small chance the current conservative 
Supreme Court would hold that Section 2 of the Sherman Act (or Section 5 of the FTC 
Act) does not require anticompetitive conduct?  This article is of course making a 
textualist argument, and today the Supreme Court probably has at least 5 justices who 
sometimes or always are receptive to textualist arguments.321  If the next election gives 
our country a President who believes in sanctioning all monopolies, could the Court be 
open to the possibility that the Sherman Act (or at least the FTC Act) is a no-fault statute?                         
 
 Everyone agrees that courts should faithfully interpret and implement the words 
of statutes when they are clear.322  But whether a statute is “clear” often is in the mind of 
the judge or justice.323 As practical matter, the Court’s decision as to the Sherman Act’s 
clarity on the no-fault issue could depend in part upon what particular justices think about 
the net economic effects of sanctioning all monopolies.  
 
 
319 Louis D. Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Jan. 10 1914, at 114–16 
(1934).  
 
320 See Mr. Dooley, WIKIPEDIA,  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mr._Dooley (accessed Feb. 
15, 2020). 
 
321 See Krishnakumar, supra note 45 at 226, providing a chart with a breakdown of 
judicial decisions involving a textualist approach and which Justice authored each 
one.  The author considers Justice Thomas a "textualist" and Roberts and Alito as 
"textualist leaning." Id. at 226 n. 18. If Gorsuch and Kavanaugh are added as 
textualists, it appears that the Supreme Court has 5 textualist or "textualist leaning" 
Justices.  See also Justice Kagan, supra note 17, “we are a generally, fairly textualist 
court.” 
 
322 See Scalia, supra note 44, at 16: "When the text of a statute is clear, that is the end." 
 
323 See Brett N. Kavanaugh, supra note 130,  at 2119. As Justice Kagan noted, “ "[P]retty 
much all of us now look at the text first and the text is what matters most," Kagan said 
Monday. "And if you can find clarity in the text that's pretty much the end of the 




 As Justice Kavanaugh noted, the “absurdity doctrine”324 prevents statutes 
from being interpreted irrationally. If a majority of Supreme Court justices 
believe that no-fault is, from an economic perspective, “absurd”, they surely won’t 
find that the Sherman Act or FTC Act embodies a congressional intent to sanction all 
monopolies.   
 
 On the other hand, the justices may believe, as we do, that reasonable people 
can disagree over its net economic effects. This article has shown that no-fault’s 
overall net effects on economic welfare depend upon a number of empirical issues 
whose effects are unknown and ambiguous on both an overall perspective and in 
particular contexts.  If the justices believe that the net effects are close from an 
economic perspective, and not “absurd,” they should be more likely to implement a 
“fair reading” of the words of Section 2 and sanction all monopolies. We believe that 
the issue deserves thoughtful analysis both overall and in particular industry 
contexts.  
 
 In 2016 (then) Judge Gorsuch observed: “[A] judge who likes every result he 
reaches is very likely a bad judge, reaching for results he prefers rather than those the law 
compels.”325  If the current conservative Supreme Court does not want the Sherman Act 
or the FTC Act to sanction all monopolies, it should heed the more recent advice of 
Justice Gorsuch. “If a statute needs repair, there’s a constitutionally prescribed way to do 






324 See Kavanaugh, note 130 supra. 
 
 325  A.M. ex rel. FM v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1170 (10th Cir. 2016).   For an excellent 





 326  Perry v. Merit Sys. Protection Board, 137 S. Ct 1975, 1990 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
